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THE PARENT TRAP: THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
PRACTICE OF SEVERING PARENTAL RIGHTS 
WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW 
Kendra Huard Fershee* 
ABSTRACT 
In 1997, Congress passed the Adoption and Safe Families Act 
(ASFA) to stem what it perceived as an overreliance by states on foster 
care to provide a safe place for children whose parents had been 
accused of abuse or neglect. Prior to ASFA, many children were placed 
in foster care for extended periods of time while their parents were 
evaluated for fitness and rehabilitative efforts were made to reunify 
families. Congress considered the time children spent in foster care as 
damaging to them because it left them uncertain about where they 
would live in the future. Congress, in an attempt to reduce the amount 
of time children spend in foster care, included provisions in ASFA that 
require states to expedite termination of parental rights to such a speed 
that states have been engaging in, for many years, systematic 
deprivation of parents’ procedural and substantive due process rights. 
Child abuse and neglect have always been a problem in every 
society, but many cultures, including American culture, have a poor 
track record of successfully addressing the problem. Early American 
history shows a lack of appreciation or understanding of the problem, 
and the evolution of policies to combat child abuse and neglect has 
been slow and somewhat ineffectual. At the same time, courts have not 
had a spectacular record of effectively addressing the problem of child 
abuse and neglect. The Supreme Court was slow to consider problems 
related to families and did not decide a case regarding the rights of 
parents to the care, control, and custody of their children until the late 
1920s. And it was not until the 1980s that the Court finally declared 
that parents have a substantive due process right to the custody of their 
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children. 
Even though it took many years, the Supreme Court’s recent 
recognition of protections for the procedural and substantive due 
process rights of parents is clear: states must be extremely cautious 
when seeking to terminate parental rights. However, after ASFA, the 
opposite has been happening. States have every incentive to rush to 
judgment and sever parental rights, even when there is no evidence the 
parent ever abused the child being removed and even when the parent 
is someone who could be a wonderful, loving, and caring parent. These 
due process violations occur in the context of ASFA provisions that 
make exceptions to the requirement that states make reasonable efforts 
to reunify families separated after an allegation of abuse or neglect. 
In the second most constitutionally problematic provision of ASFA, 
states may forego reasonable efforts to reunite parents with a removed 
child (automatically at birth, in many circumstances) when the parents 
have previously lost custody of a sibling. Then, in the most 
constitutionally problematic provision, states must rush to terminate 
the parental rights of those individuals, even with no evidence they 
would be unfit to parent the newborn child. Unfortunately, many state 
courts apply these provisions with heavy hands, resulting in improper 
terminations or near misses that are overturned upon appeal. Congress 
must change ASFA to incentivize states to act in accordance with the 
Constitution when terminating parental rights, and the Supreme Court 
should issue binding precedent to prohibit permanent severance of 
parental rights based on evidence of past misconduct alone. Until then, 
parents are extremely vulnerable to state court judges who are guided 
by an unconstitutional statute and who may not appreciate the 
constitutional risks in its application. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A baby is born every eight seconds in the United States.1 At that 
moment, several constitutional rights are also born, including the 
constitutional rights of parents to the care, custody, and control of their 
child.2 The constitutional right of parents to direct and control the 
upbringing of their child was one of the first substantive due process 
rights the Supreme Court recognized.3 Parental rights are among the 
most sacrosanct rights in American jurisprudence, require a high 
standard of proof before a state can interfere with them, and are 
carefully guarded by courts.4 Or are they? 
Of course, the constitutional right of parents to direct and control 
the upbringing of their child, like every constitutional right, is not 
absolute. It can be severed when a parent poses a substantial risk to the 
physical or emotional health or safety of the child.5 Over the last ninety 
years, since the Supreme Court first recognized the liberty interests of 
a parent,6 courts and legislatures have struggled to balance individuals’ 
                                                                                                                 
 1. U.S. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/popclock/ (last 
visited Nov. 4, 2013). 
 2. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (“In light of [the] extensive precedent, it cannot now 
be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of 
parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.”). For the purposes 
of this Article, parental rights generally mean the rights of biological mothers and married couples because 
the parental rights of unmarried biological fathers are less protected by the Due Process Clause. Michael 
H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124–25 (1989) (holding that a man who fathered a child with a married 
woman did not have a due process right to challenge California’s recognition of the mother’s husband as 
the legal father of the child, even when the biological father had a well-established relationship with the 
child); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983) (holding that the due process rights of a putative 
father who had not “grasp[ed] [the] opportunity” of building a relationship with his child were not violated 
when he was not notified of an impending adoption proceeding of his daughter); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 
U.S. 246, 249, 254–56 (1978) (holding that a biological father who never legitimated his child by filing 
paperwork to claim the child as his was not deprived of his due process rights when his parental rights 
were terminated). 
 3. E.g., Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 
399–400 (1923). 
 4. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399–400 (“The established doctrine is that this liberty may not be interfered 
with, under the guise of protecting the public interest, by legislative action which is arbitrary or without 
reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the state to effect.”). 
 5. E.g., In re J.H., 523 S.E.2d 374, 379 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (affirming the lower court’s termination 
of parental rights when “the mother exposed the child to an abusive, nomadic, and turbulent lifestyle filled 
with unrehabilitated drug use and violence”). 
 6. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399. 
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rights to parent and children’s rights to be free from harm.7 The 
definition of harm has grown and evolved, as has the notion of what it 
means to have a liberty interest to parent.8 Placing the fulcrum in the 
precise location to perfectly balance the rights of children and their 
parents has proven nearly impossible, and in the last twenty years or 
so, states and Congress have made matters worse by striving for 
efficiency in the process of seeking permanence for children whose 
parents have been accused of being unfit to parent.9 
In a well-intentioned effort to protect children from harm, Congress 
and many states have enacted one-size-fits-all laws that work to sever 
a parent’s constitutional rights in an efficient, if nevertheless 
unconstitutional, manner. This happens in a couple ways. First, some 
states have devised plans that require removal of newborns from their 
parents’ custody before they have even left the hospital and without 
any evidence of abuse or neglect, typically because their parental rights 
had been previously involuntarily terminated with respect to a sibling 
of the newborn. In those cases, under the federal statutory scheme, 
states can and indeed are encouraged to forego efforts to seek 
reunification. These procedural requirements, in all their efficiency, 
create a perfect storm for some parents, making it impossible for them 
to (1) prevent their children from being whisked away at birth and (2) 
retain their parental rights to those children once they are removed 
from their custody.10 
There are serious constitutional concerns with state interference at 
both stages. First, some states, as a matter of course, remove newborns 
from the custody of parents whose parental rights to other children 
have been terminated in the past.11 Next, the federal Adoption and Safe 
Families Act (ASFA) gives financial incentives to states enacting its 
                                                                                                                 
 7. For a discussion of balancing the state’s parens patriae interest in protecting the child and the 
parent’s due process rights, see Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766–68 (1982). The medical 
community has also discussed this issue for the last four decades. Theo Solomon, History and 
Demography of Child Abuse, 51 PEDIATRICS 773, 774–75 (1973). “In child welfare today, the basic 
problem still exists: at what point does the harm of leaving a child in an abusive environment override the 
negative consequences of splintering the family . . . ?” Id. at 774. 
 8. See discussion infra Part I. 
 9. See discussion infra Part II. 
 10. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 11. See infra notes 252–55 and accompanying text. 
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dictates, which include a provision allowing state child welfare 
agencies to refuse to make reasonable efforts to reunite parents with 
children removed from their custody if their parental rights to another 
child have been involuntarily terminated.12 Third, some state laws are 
so onerous that many parents, including those who would be good 
parents to the removed children, cannot meet the expectations and lose 
parental rights in a very short period of time.13 Legislation allowing 
the removal of newborns without evidence of abuse and requiring the 
expedited processes toward final termination of parental rights violates 
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and must be amended to allow parents to 
retain their procedural and substantive due process rights to parent. 
I.   THE EVOLVING DOCTRINE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO 
PARENT 
The belief that a state has the right or even the duty to intervene 
when a child has been abused is a somewhat modern notion. In the 
early years of America’s history, the number of laws aimed at 
protecting children from their parents’ abuse was nearly zero. States 
simply did not see it as within the power or province of the government 
to interfere with a parent’s methods of discipline.14 
A.   Children as the Father’s Chattel 
Historically, in many cultures, children were considered the 
property of their fathers.15 They could be sold at the will of the father, 
beaten for any reason at all, or even murdered if the parents or 
community deemed it necessary to be rid of an extra mouth to feed.16 
The notion that children were the property of their fathers meant they 
                                                                                                                 
 12. 42 U.S.C. § 671(15)(D)(iii) (2006). 
 13. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 14. See BRIAN CORBY, CHILD ABUSE: TOWARDS A KNOWLEDGE BASE 17–21 (1993). 
 15. MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA 235–38 (1985); MARGARET O. HYDE, CRY SOFTLY! THE STORY OF CHILD 
ABUSE 36 (1980). 
 16. HYDE, supra note 15, at 34–41. 
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could be treated in any way the father felt appropriate and no one could 
intervene on behalf of the child.17 The Code of Hammurabi, based on 
Babylonian law instituted as early as 2130 B.C., permitted fathers to 
sell their children or wives in payment of a debt.18 Life was hard for 
everyone in ancient times, and children were perceived as little more 
than hungry, expensive burdens who were lucky to have been allowed 
to live after birth.19 
In early American colonial times, children fared little better than 
their counterparts in ancient times.20 They were still considered the 
father’s chattel and were subjected to horrific abuse, which was lawful 
if intended to correct the misdeeds of the child as defined by the 
father.21 As long as the parent did not murder the child, the punishment 
was considered lawful.22 Children who did not have parents or children 
whose parents were too poor to protect them were likely to be entered 
into indentured servitude.23 The concept that children were property of 
the father spilled over to the belief that parentless children were either 
a burden or a commodity to ignore or trade as needed.24 
Indentured servants were required to work in exchange for the basic 
necessities in life.25 The agreements of servitude often carried with 
them some protections against mistreatment, but in reality, could do 
little to actually stop an abusive master from brutally disciplining his 
servant.26 Although the system was meant to provide children with 
                                                                                                                 
 17. Id. at 37; MARIA SCANNAPIECO & KELLI CONNELL-CARRICK, UNDERSTANDING CHILD 
MALTREATMENT: AN ECOLOGICAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE 6 (2005). 
 18. HYDE, supra note 15, at 36. 
 19. See id. at 37–39. 
 20. See LEROY ASHBY, ENDANGERED CHILDREN: DEPENDENCY, NEGLECT, AND ABUSE IN 
AMERICAN HISTORY 6–7 (1997). 
 21. Id.; Marvin Ventrell, From Cause to Profession: The Development of Children’s Law and 
Practice, COLO. LAW., Jan. 2003, at 66. 
 22. See ASHBY, supra note 20, at 6–7. 
 23. Id. at 7–8; JOHN E. B. MYERS, CHILD PROTECTION IN AMERICA: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 11–
12 (2006) (“Involuntary apprenticeship was used for substantial numbers of poor children and orphans. 
Local officials had authority to remove dependent children from their parents and place the children with 
masters.”). Placing impoverished children in indentured servant arrangements originated from the British 
“poor laws.” Janet L. Dolgin, Transforming Childhood: Apprenticeship in American Law, 31 NEW. ENG. 
L. REV. 1113, 1122 (1997). 
 24. ASHBY, supra note 20, at 10–14. 
 25. Id. at 6. 
 26. Id. at 6–8; GROSSBERG, supra note 15, at 264–66. 
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some education, food, shelter, and other basic needs in life, it was a 
poorly monitored system that left children to the whims of their 
masters.27 The Kansas territorial legislature, in 1855, made it legal to 
bind orphaned children to servitude and included a provision stating 
that killing servants in the process of disciplining them was not 
considered a crime.28 During the time these types of laws and 
agreements reigned, however, attitudes about the role of children in 
society started to change.29 
Over time, society began to slowly accept the notion that children 
were more than their father’s possessions, that they deserved at least 
some basic protection from harm.30 In an increasingly industrial 
society, work shifted away from the home.31 Men began to work in 
mills and factories, leaving their wives to care for the home and the 
children.32 Especially in middle- and upper-class families, the sphere 
of the home became dominated by the idealized concept of mothers as 
the noble and moral protectors of their families, and children were 
perceived as innocent, pure creatures deserving of their mothers’ 
tender loving care.33 These “cult of motherhood” notions may have 
contributed, in part, to the beginning of a new and more charitable 
societal attitude about the role of children within the family.34 
In the mid- to late-1800s, concerned citizens began to form societies 
for the purpose of “child-saving,” rescuing children from harmful 
living situations.35 The shift started at the grassroots level and was 
disjointed, disorganized, and unfocused.36 The challenges facing 
                                                                                                                 
 27. See ASHBY, supra note 20, at 21; MYERS, supra note 23, at 12. 
 28. ASHBY, supra note 20, at 21. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 19. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See id. 
 33. Id.; LELA B. COSTIN ET AL., THE POLITICS OF CHILD ABUSE IN AMERICA 50–51 (Duncan 
Lindsey ed., 1996); see BARBARA J. NELSON, MAKING AN ISSUE OF CHILD ABUSE: POLITICAL AGENDA 
SETTING FOR SOCIAL PROBLEMS 6 (1984). The modern family stems from the bourgeoisie of the late 
1800s. NELSON, supra, at 6. Upper-class families tended to recognize that children had natural rights, and 
in these homes, excessive violence was not tolerated. See id. 
 34. See ASHBY, supra note 20, at 19. 
 35. COSTIN ET AL., supra note 33, at 46; MYERS supra note 23, at 37 (“By 1880, there were thirty-
seven [nongovernmental] child protection societies in the United States.”). 
 36. See COSTIN ET AL., supra note 33, at 46–47. 
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families in these times were numerous and particularly affected 
children through child abuse, poverty, child labor, poor access to 
medical attention, lack of educational opportunities, and more.37 The 
theories and philosophies addressing the problems faced by children 
varied, but a common theme began to develop: to separate children 
from their parents in the name of saving the children.38 Of course, this 
theory was nearly always employed against families struggling with 
poverty, where it was believed that families with financial strains were 
ill equipped to raise children who could contribute to society 
meaningfully.39 
As society began to awaken to the plight of children in abusive 
homes and the difficulties poverty presented to some children’s lives, 
states began to look at the needs of children when deciding what 
should happen to those who had been abused or were the subject of a 
custody dispute.40 When evaluating custody disputes, courts began to 
consider “the best interests of the child,” and on occasion, broke with 
the long-standing legal practice of automatically awarding custody to 
the father.41 The “tender years doctrine” allowed mothers to retain 
custody of their very young children, while fathers were still awarded 
custody of any older children.42 This change was obviously rooted in 
gender-specific notions about the skills it takes to raise children, but it 
                                                                                                                 
 37. See id. During the mid- to late-1800s, the population of urban industrial areas grew immensely. 
ASHBY, supra note 20, at 41. Many “child savers” condemned the immigrant urban lifestyle and believed 
that urban “corruption” bred juvenile delinquents. See ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE 
INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 40–41 (2d ed. 1977). This belief reinforced the notion that children of poor 
families were better served by being taken out of their homes in the city and “reformed.” See id. at 61–
62. 
 38. ASHBY, supra note 20, at 23–29. For instance, The New York Society for the Prevention of 
Cruelty to Children favored “rescuing” children and separating them from their homes rather than 
rehabilitating families. NELSON, supra note 33, at 8. 
 39. See ASHBY, supra note 20, at 22–24; see also DUNCAN LINDSEY, THE WELFARE OF CHILDREN 17 
(2d ed. 2004) (“[Many times] children were removed from impoverished lone mothers and placed in ‘good 
Christian homes’ in the country, which were viewed as providing a clean wholesome environment . . . .”). 
 40. ASHBY, supra note 20, at 19. 
 41. Id. Many scholars cite the industrial revolution of the nineteenth century, which forced many men 
to work away from the home, as the impetus for the cultural shift to presume that children fair better in 
their mother’s custody. See Cynthia A. McNeely, Comment, Lagging Behind the Times: Parenthood, 
Custody, and Gender Bias in the Family Court, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 891, 898–99 (1998). 
 42. See ASHBY, supra note 20, at 19. Most states followed the tender years doctrine until the late 
1960s. Julie E. Artis, Judging the Best Interests of the Child: Judges’ Accounts of the Tender Years 
Doctrine, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 769, 774 (2004). 
9
Fershee: The Parent Trap: The Unconstitutional Practice of Severing Parent
Published by Reading Room, 2014
648 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:3 
signaled a change in courts’ willingness to consider the needs of 
children, not just the legal rights of their fathers, when determining 
custody.43 This change in approach, to include understanding 
children’s needs, ushered in a new era of court interference with 
families and initiated the burgeoning concept of “judicial 
patriarchy.”44 
B.   Hyper-interference by the State Into Family Life 
From today’s perspective, it is almost impossible to imagine how 
society could have accepted the notion of children as chattel, 
essentially less than human, and defined by a value that lay wholly 
with their fathers. But in the mid-1800s, private organizations started 
to recognize the problem and began to intervene, trying to effect 
change.45 Government, both federal and state, followed suit in the late 
1800s and took a special interest in protecting children from neglect 
and abuse by their caregivers.46 Interestingly, in the 1920s, the issue 
faded again, until the 1960s, when a resurgence of interest in protecting 
children from harm began.47 Despite the fact that society has been only 
intermittently concerned with child abuse, when it is an issue at the 
forefront of society’s consciousness, the government has responded by 
erring on the side of a hyper-adversarial interference into family life, 
                                                                                                                 
 43. See ASHBY, supra note 20, at 19; COSTIN ET AL., supra note 33, at 62. 
 44. See COSTIN ET AL., supra note 33, at 61–62. Michael Grossberg coined the term “judicial 
patriarchy” in his book GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY 
AMERICA. Id. Grossberg discussed the increased willingness of courts and legislators to intervene in 
familial matters in the nineteenth century: 
Judges were new kinds of patriarchs, ones invested with a power over some domestic 
relations that rivaled that of their predecessors. They used the broad discretionary authority 
conferred on them by equity and common-law procedures, and conceded by legislative 
inertia, to rewrite the laws governing the allocation of resources, rights, and duties within 
the home and between family members and the state. 
GROSSBERG, supra note 15, at 290. 
 45. MYERS, supra note 23, at 37. 
 46. See id. at 58; see also LINDSEY, supra note 39, at 24 & Figure 1.2 (charting the growth of child 
welfare agencies in the mid-twentieth century). The number of employees in the public child welfare 
system increased during this time. LINDSEY, supra note 39, at 24 & Figure 1.2. In 1960, there were roughly 
7,500 employees. Id. By 1976, this number grew to roughly 30,000 employees. Id. 
 47. See MYERS, supra note 23, at 72, 76. (“The Great Depression . . . hastened the demise of 
nongovernmental SPCCs. The charitable contributions that were the lifeblood of SPCCs dried up with the 
economy . . . .”). 
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instead of a more collegial, problem-solving approach.48 
1.   The Beginnings of the “Child-Saving” Movement: The Mid- to 
Late-1800s 
In the mid- to late-1800s, it appeared that society had begun to 
understand that control of the parent-child relationship was not solely 
within the province of the father. And although the “cult of 
motherhood” idea began to emerge, exalting women in their roles as 
protectors of children and caretakers of the family, the male-dominated 
legal community was reluctant to recognize mothers as having legal 
custodial rights to their children in many cases.49 In a somewhat 
expected yet still shocking shift, upon complaints of abuse or neglect, 
courts began to rescind the parental rights and responsibilities of 
fathers and insert the state, instead of the mother, as the caretaker of 
the children.50 The change was dubbed the beginning of judicial 
patriarchy, where judges trusted themselves and the state to better care 
for children who had suffered abuse at home rather than mothers who 
may have had no part in the abuse.51 This new attitude created an 
adversarial relationship between courts and parents deemed unfit,52 
and it likely set the stage for the current struggle over the balance of 
power between states and parents to direct and control the upbringing 
of children. 
As has been evidenced by the foregoing discussion of the rights of 
parents (fathers, really) to direct and control the upbringing of their 
children and the state’s willingness or reluctance to insert itself into 
that relationship, harmony between the two parties is elusive. Trying 
to protect children from harm within the family, while protecting the 
autonomy of the family unit, are, in many ways, necessarily 
incongruous efforts. The state is right to concern itself with the welfare 
of all children, and when a parent is accused of abuse or neglect, the 
state must take steps to protect the child at risk. The complexity of the 
                                                                                                                 
 48. See COSTIN ET AL., supra note 33, at 62. 
 49. ASHBY, supra note 20, at 19. 
 50. See COSTIN ET AL., supra note 33, at 62. 
 51. See id.; see also GROSSBERG, supra note 15, at 248–50. 
 52. COSTIN ET AL., supra note 33, at 62. 
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family dynamic and the attachment that children have to their parents 
make it difficult to strike the perfect balance between appropriate 
intervention and improper or unlawful interference. But when, more 
than one hundred years ago, government began to understand its role 
in protecting children from family abuse as a necessity in some 
circumstances, the pendulum swung too far in the direction of injecting 
the state into the family.53 
Theories abound to explain how child abuse went from a family 
matter that was little discussed and widely ignored to a major societal 
issue that garnered significant political attention.54 Probably the most 
widely held theory centered on the story of Mary Ellen Connolly, an 
abused child who, at ten years old, became the center of a national 
news story.55 The abuse that Mary Ellen suffered was not unlike that 
which many children suffered at the time, but because of the efforts of 
a few people who took a particular interest in Mary Ellen’s plight, her 
story became highly publicized and widely reported.56 The often 
“lurid” reporting of the abuse she suffered and the process of 
attempting to remove Mary Ellen from the custody of her guardians 
was met with outrage from the public, and many people believe, was 
a major contributor to the beginnings of the anti-cruelty to children 
movement in the late-1800s.57 However, an entire movement cannot 
be built or sustained on a single motivator alone, and there were many 
issues rising in societal consciousness that made child abuse a rallying 
point for activists seeking change in the American social construct at 
the time Mary Ellen’s abuse became known.58 
After a few months of trying to intervene on Mary Ellen’s behalf 
without success, Etta Wheeler called upon Henry Bergh, who was, at 
the time, President of the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Animals in New York City.59 Mr. Bergh turned to the Society’s general 
                                                                                                                 
 53. See discussion supra Part I.A. 
 54. See ASHBY, supra note 20, at 57–59; COSTIN ET AL., supra note 33, at 74. 
 55. ASHBY, supra note 20, at 55–59; COSTIN ET AL., supra note 33, at 51–57. 
 56. ASHBY, supra note 20, at 55; COSTIN ET AL., supra note 33, at 52. 
 57. ASHBY, supra note 20, at 57; COSTIN ET AL., supra note 33, at 57–61. 
 58. COSTIN ET AL., supra note 33, at 74. 
 59. Id. at 53. 
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counsel, Elbridge Gerry, for help.60 At the time in New York, there 
were no laws prohibiting children from being abused by their parents, 
but there were laws preventing cruelty to animals.61 With help from 
Ms. Wheeler, Mr. Bergh, and Mr. Gerry, the argument was made that 
Mary Ellen was an animal deserving of protection under the statute, 
and so the legend goes, Mary Ellen’s adoptive parent was sentenced to 
prison within days of their intervention.62 And, almost as swiftly, the 
New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children was 
born.63 
Elbridge Gerry was an influential and passionate figure in the anti-
cruelty movement.64 He began to build the anti-cruelty movement by 
bringing together wealthy and powerful white men who were 
interested in combating child abuse, though primarily through the 
notion of social control of society’s “less fortunate” members.65 Social 
control is the notion that society’s challenges and difficulties can be 
confronted and improved by forcing people to behave in certain 
ways.66 Elbridge Gerry sought to end child abuse by prosecuting 
abusive parents who were morally low, and as considered by Gerry, to 
be hardened, drawn to impurity, and part of a “dangerous class” of 
people.67 Gerry was not alone in his contempt for the “class” of people 
who abused children, and this classist and patriarchal attitude set the 
tone for courts who were beginning to awaken to the child abuse 
problem in America at the time.68 
At the same time Mary Ellen’s case was making headlines, several 
                                                                                                                 
 60. Id. 
 61. See id. 
 62. Id. This legend is inaccurate in many ways, including the timeline of bringing Mrs. Connolly to 
justice for Mary Ellen’s abuse, which was actually much slower, as well as the passion with which Mr. 
Bergh compared Mary Ellen to an animal needing protection. Id. at 53–61. The fact that the media account 
caught the fancy of the public and likely spurred the beginning of the movement to prevent child abuse is 
the relevant point here. See id. 
 63. Id. at 53. 
 64. COSTIN ET AL., supra note 33, at 61. 
 65. Id. at 64–70. 
 66. Id. at 67–70. 
 67. See id. at 66. 
 68. Id. at 74. Charles Loring Brace was also making headlines in the mid- to late-1800s as the head of 
the New York Children’s Aid Society, which made a practice of placing homeless or destitute children 
into homes of families as a form of indentured servitude. ASHBY, supra note 20, at 39–40. Brace thought 
of the children he “helped” as a “‘happy race of little heathens and barbarians.’” Id. at 39. 
13
Fershee: The Parent Trap: The Unconstitutional Practice of Severing Parent
Published by Reading Room, 2014
652 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:3 
other important issues for women, children, and families were gaining 
attention in America.69 Women’s suffrage, temperance, the 
improvement of the place of women within the family, attempts to stop 
or ameliorate domestic violence, and more were the focus for many 
activists seeking change in patriarchal America.70 At the same time, 
judicial patriarchy, mixed with the rise of Elbridge Gerry and Charles 
Loring Brace and their patriarchal notions of combating child abuse by 
targeting and splitting impoverished families, created an adversarial 
relationship between families and the state.71 This was the tone 
heading into the Progressive Era, when the government began to take 
an active role in the prevention of child abuse. 
2.   The Progressive Reform Period: 1890–1920 
In the late-1800s, the problem of child abuse started to receive more 
attention from official governmental entities than it ever had.72 The 
White House held the Conference on the Care of Dependent Children, 
juvenile courts began to emerge around the country, and legislatures 
began to pass laws to address problems of neglect, abuse, and child 
delinquency.73 The attention on the problem was a positive shift from 
the era when adults could abuse and neglect children, even murder 
them, with few repercussions. But the change was not necessarily 
entirely positive. For a multitude of reasons, like the private entities 
fighting child abuse, the public institutions charged with addressing 
the problem of child abuse and neglect could be hostile toward, and 
judgmental of, families touched by abuse.74 
When a state identified a child as “needy,” it commonly responded 
by separating the child from the family, even if the child’s parents were 
loving and committed to caring for their child.75 A general disdain for, 
and apprehension of, people who lived in poverty caused society to 
                                                                                                                 
 69. See COSTIN ET AL., supra note 33, at 74. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 62, 66, 74. 
 72. See ASHBY, supra note 20, at 79–84. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 79–80. 
 75. See id. at 82–83. 
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view children born into households without substantial means as 
neglected and delinquent, even if neither was true.76 Although those 
who attended the White House Conference on the Care of Dependent 
Children largely agreed that it was important to maintain and preserve 
family units as much as possible, in reality, the opposite happened.77 
Dependency, delinquency, abuse, and neglect were viewed as 
essentially the same problems, and judges were likely to send children 
to orphanages or foster care in order to “rescue” them, even if they 
were not abused or neglected.78 The state’s intervention tended to be 
as heavy handed as possible, without much regard for helping build 
and preserve family autonomy. 
Recognizing as flawed the system of removing children from their 
parents’ custody when poverty was the only transgression, 
progressives focused on issues of child welfare in the early 1900s 
began to push for reforms that would allow children to stay with the 
mothers struggling to care for them.79 The new system, providing 
“mothers’ pensions” to women unable to make enough money to 
provide for their children, was intended to keep families together.80 
Progressives sought to depart from the routine practice of removing 
children who were not abused or neglected from their impoverished 
homes and instead provide enough financial assistance that their 
mothers could feed and clothe them.81 Mothers’ pensions were a 
popular policy shift for a short period of time, but they were ill-
conceived and created new challenges for mothers trying to maintain 
custody of their children.82 In reality, mothers’ pensions did little to 
stop states from removing children from their mothers’ custody and 
were more effective at reinforcing the notion that the state should step 
                                                                                                                 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See ASHBY, supra note 20, at 82. 
 79. Id. at 94. 
 80. Id. at 94–98; MYERS, supra note 23, at 60 (“The first statewide laws authorizing mothers’ pensions 
were passed in 1911 . . . . By 1920, forty states had mothers’ pension laws, and by 1935, nearly all states 
had such laws.”). 
 81. ASHBY, supra note 20, at 94–97. 
 82. Id. at 96–97. Mothers’ pensions were often not large enough to allow a mother to stay at home 
with her children full time, requiring her to work at least some portion of a week. Id. at 97. Doing so risked 
her ability to keep her children because childcare was extremely difficult to obtain. Id. 
15
Fershee: The Parent Trap: The Unconstitutional Practice of Severing Parent
Published by Reading Room, 2014
654 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:3 
into the shoes of parents deemed “lesser than” for any number of 
reasons.83 
The paradigm shift away from viewing children as property of their 
fathers toward protecting children from harm appears to have been 
dramatic and widespread, affecting multiple levels of society.84 After 
so many centuries of ignoring issues of child abuse and neglect, courts 
were suddenly given broad power to save children from harm.85 Courts 
took that mandate seriously and began to step into the role of parent 
through the doctrine of parens patriae.86 The overriding belief at the 
time was that the environment in which children were raised was the 
dominating influence on the child’s behavior, so if a child was prone 
to misbehaving, it was necessary for the court to intercede and remove 
the child from the home.87 This dramatic swing, from the societal 
belief that government’s role in family decision making should be 
limited or nonexistent to the widespread acceptance of government 
action severing families for apparently small transgressions, was 
powerful and likely the cause of yet another paradigm shift at the end 
of the Progressive Reform Period. 
3.   The Fall and Resurrection of Child Abuse Issue Recognition: 
1920–1960 
The goal of ending, or at least limiting, child abuse and neglect 
seems like the kind of issue that is likely to be perceived as important, 
no matter what political, legal, or policy challenges the country is 
facing. But between 1920 and 1960, the issue of child abuse and 
neglect faded into the background, leaving children largely ignored 
once again.88 Positive change continued throughout this era, but the 
                                                                                                                 
 83. See id. at 99–100. 
 84. See COSTIN ET AL., supra note 33, at 46–48. 
 85. Id. at 48. The phrase parens patriae means “‘ultimate parent’ or ‘parent of the country.’” Ventrell, 
supra note 21, at 66. “The courts accepted the logic that society was entitled to take custody of a child 
without due process of law, regardless of his or her status as victim or offender, because of the state’s 
authority and obligation to save its children from becoming criminal.” Id. 
 86. COSTIN ET AL., supra note 33, at 48. 
 87. Id. 
 88. CORBY, supra note 14, at 26; COSTIN ET AL., supra note 33, at 82; MYERS, supra note 23, at 79; 
see generally C. Henry Kempe et al., The Battered-Child Syndrome, 181 JAMA 105 (1962). Dr. Henry 
Kempe, a pediatrician, increased awareness in child abuse and neglect when he published a series of 
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fervor surrounding the issue of “child saving” essentially died.89 There 
are many potential reasons for this, including discord among groups 
dedicated to eradicating child abuse and neglect, a refocus of the 
feminist movement away from child saving and toward issues more 
directly related to women, and, most importantly for the purposes of 
this article, disillusionment with the juvenile courts.90 The juvenile 
courts, once thought of as the answer to the problems of child abuse 
and neglect, began to receive criticism about decisions they made and 
how they made them.91 
As stated above, juvenile courts often did not know how to make 
the distinction between child neglect and child delinquency, which 
resulted in wildly divergent decisions about how to help at-risk 
children.92 Children who were neglected or whose parents had died 
were routinely removed from whatever family they did have and 
labeled delinquent or dependent at the whim of the judge.93 Judges did 
not have much law to guide them, and little or no training in social 
work, so their decisions about how to assist families in need were often 
rudderless and inconsistent.94 Judges took control of every aspect of 
abuse and neglect cases, including recruiting foster and adoptive 
homes, placing children in those homes, and supervising the 
placements.95 This judicial hyper-intervention marginalized social 
work and further pushed the issues of child abuse and neglect into 
public policy dormancy.96 
Throughout the first 150 years of the nation’s existence, there was 
no real clarity about how to treat the legal rights of parents and 
children. It was not necessarily even clear that children had legal 
rights, and if they did, to what extent they would be recognized and 
                                                                                                                 
articles that described the numerous incidents of child abuse he witnessed. CORBY, supra note 14, at 26–
27; see generally Henry Kempe et al., supra. Dr. Kempe and his associates ultimately coined the term 
“battered child syndrome.” CORBY, supra note 14, at 26–27. 
 89. ASHBY, supra note 20, at 101. 
 90. COSTIN ET AL., supra note 33, at 82–91. 
 91. Id. at 90–92. 
 92. See id.; Ventrell, supra note 21, at 67. 
 93. COSTIN ET AL., supra note 33, at 91. 
 94. See id. at 91–92. 
 95. Id. at 91. 
 96. Id. at 92. 
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protected. And when states started to pay attention to the problem of 
child abuse and neglect, courts applied varying community standards 
to parents who stood accused of abuse or neglect.97 The extreme 
dichotomy in how the public viewed the rights of parents to raise their 
children throughout America’s history highlighted how it could take 
so long for the Supreme Court to weigh in on the issue. Even though 
it was one of the first fundamental rights recognized by the Supreme 
Court, the right of parents to direct and control the upbringing of their 
children was not recognized until 55 years after the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s ratification.98 
C.   Supreme Court Decisions About the Rights of Parents to Raise 
Their Children 
During the years leading to the modern view of how child abuse and 
neglect should be addressed, courts grappled with determining the 
appropriate level of governmental involvement in families’ lives and 
which government entities should be responsible for the intervention.99 
Few regulations, statutes, or common law cases defined or limited the 
proper level of court intervention after an allegation of abuse or 
neglect.100 Until the Supreme Court decided Meyer v. Nebraska in 
1923, there was no jurisprudence regarding the constitutional rights of 
parents to make decisions about how to raise their children.101 Not until 
1974 did federal legislation exist to address the problem of child 
abuse.102 And it was not until 1982 that the fundamental right of 
parents to retain custody of their children was separately 
acknowledged from the right to direct and control the upbringing of a 
                                                                                                                 
 97. See generally MYERS, supra note 23. 
 98. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399–401 (1923). 
 99. See Libby S. Adler, The Meanings of Permanence: A Critical Analysis of the Adoption and Safe 
Families Act of 1997, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 13–20 (2001). 
 100. See COSTIN ET AL., supra note 33, at 89–92. 
 101. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399 (“While this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty 
thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and some of the included things have been 
definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of 
the individual to . . . establish a home and bring up children . . . .”). 
 102. The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5119c (2006)); see Adler, supra note 99, at 17–18. 
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child.103 
1.   The Constitutional Right to Make Parenting Decisions 
As is often true in any constitutional doctrine, the Court has 
considered many avenues of parenting rights throughout its history. 
The Court has determined that persons have a constitutional right to 
choose to avoid parenthood.104 A parent’s constitutional right to keep 
a family together,105 to make educational and religious decisions for a 
child,106 and to retain the custody of a child107 have all been decided 
by the Court. The bases for those rights have been found mostly in the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection 
clauses.108 The two most important pieces of the rights to parent for 
the purposes of this article are the right to custody and the right to 
direct and control the upbringing of a child, both of which have been 
addressed separately by the Court, and at times, have been conflated 
into one all-encompassing “right to parent.”109 
The right to parent has been broken into what can be viewed as two 
lanes of a highway heading in the same direction. In one lane, a parent 
has the right to the custody of her children, although that right can be 
limited or terminated when there is proof that the parent is neglectful, 
abusive, or somehow harmful to the child.110 In the other lane, a parent 
has a right to say how she would like to raise her children, i.e., how to 
feed them, teach them, clothe them, expose them to religious 
education, and so on.111 Of course, those rights can be curtailed or 
                                                                                                                 
 103. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). 
 104. E.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833, 893–95 (1992) (striking a requirement that married women ask permission from their husbands 
before obtaining an abortion); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 
438, 453 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. 
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
 105. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 505–06 (1977). 
 106. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–
35 (1925); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400. 
 107. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 126–30 (1989); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 
(1972). 
 108. See cases cited supra notes 104–07. 
 109. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). 
 110. See, e.g., In re Emily, 540 S.E.2d 542, 553 (W. Va. 2000). 
 111. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651. 
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terminated in light of abuse or neglect as well.112 The distinction can 
be significant if the parents of children are not living in the same 
household and disagree about when either party should have the 
children and how the children should be raised. These concepts are 
broken into two pieces that courts consider when deciding custody 
disputes—physical and legal custody.113 
In the context of a parent’s right to retain custody of a child when 
there has been a claim of abuse or neglect or when a parent loses 
custody of a child based on the prior loss of custody of another child, 
however, the two rights cannot be disentangled. When the state 
removes children from their parents’ custody, it also removes parents’ 
right to direct and control the upbringing of their child. The separation 
of the two rights in this context is not possible or relevant; in order to 
analyze the importance of the fundamental rights of parents, the right 
to custody and to the ability to control a child’s upbringing must be 
considered together. 
Before the Court announced the fundamental right to parent, it 
developed several lines of case law that delineated particular parental 
rights. The Court, however, seemed to avoid acknowledging these 
rights as fundamental liberty interests for many decades after the 
Court’s first foray into the area.114 The wait for a clear declaration of 
the constitutional right to parent ended in 1982, when the Supreme 
Court definitively, affirmatively, and clearly stated that parents have a 
fundamental constitutional right to direct and control the upbringing 
of their children.115 According to the Court in Santosky v. Kramer, 
parents have a fundamental due process liberty interest to the custody, 
care, and control of their children.116 Although the fundamental liberty 
interest was perhaps not plainly articulated until the early 1980s, the 
Court has since made clear that the right is one of the most 
                                                                                                                 
 112. In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1374–75 (Utah 1982) (“[W]e conclude that . . . a parent [can]not . . . be 
deprived of parental rights without a showing of unfitness, abandonment, or substantial neglect . . . .”). 
 113. See DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS ET AL., CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW 743–45 (3d ed. 2012) 
(discussing the differences between physical custody and legal custody in the context of joint parenting 
arrangements). 
 114. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65–66; Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753. 
 115. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753. 
 116. Id. 
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foundational fundamental rights in the Constitution.117 The importance 
of the existence of the broad right cannot be underestimated, and the 
Court’s reticence to recognize it through the substantive due process 
rights lens perhaps led to many decades of thin protection of parents’ 
rights in custody proceedings. Only if there were procedural due 
process or equal protection problems with the way a state interfered 
with the right to parent could parents challenge the loss of their 
parental rights with constitutional backing. 
Not long after juvenile courts began to slip out of favor and the 
issues of child abuse and neglect faded from the priority list of child 
welfare activists, the Supreme Court took its first steps at recognizing 
the fundamental right of parents to raise their children.118 Before 
Meyer, the Supreme Court had never acknowledged that parents had 
any rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to parent their children.119 
The Court’s inclusion of the right in a long list of other fundamental 
rights, such as the right “to contract, to engage in any of the common 
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, [and] to marry,” 
seemed to indicate the Court believed it to be an uncontroversial right 
to enumerate.120 Of course, the right to marry, also included in the list, 
was far from settled as a fundamental right until the Court decided, in 
Loving v. Virginia, that state laws barring interracial marriage violated 
the Fourteenth Amendment.121 As with the Court’s continued analysis 
of the fundamental right to marry over the many years between Meyer 
v. Nebraska and Loving v. Virginia, the jurisprudence about the right 
to parent continued to evolve as well. 
The Supreme Court appeared to identify, for the first time, the 
                                                                                                                 
 117. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65. The Court actually stated that the fundamental liberty interest of parents to 
the care, custody, and control of their children is “perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests 
recognized” by the Court and cites to Meyer v. Nebraska in support of that proposition. Id. As discussed, 
infra, the Court did not, until much later, make as clear as Justice O’Connor suggested in the majority 
opinion of Troxel that the liberty interests of parents are fundamental. 
 118. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); see Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888) 
(acknowledging the power of the legislature over the institution of marriage and stating that marriage is 
the “most important relation in life, as having more to do with the morals and civilization of a people than 
any other institution”). Obviously, the ongoing debate over same-sex marriage keeps questions alive 
regarding to what extent marriage is truly a fundamental right under the Constitution. 
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fundamental right of parents to make decisions about how to educate 
their children with Meyer v. Nebraska and continued to shape the right 
in the following years. Having the power to decide how a child will be 
educated may have implied a more encompassing constitutional right 
for parents to raise their children, but Meyer did not definitively 
answer the question of whether parents have a fundamental due 
process right to raise their children.122 While Meyer is regarded as the 
first case that spoke to the rights of parents to raise their children, the 
issue before the Court was not whether parents had a fundamental right 
to direct and control the upbringing of their children.123 In Meyer, the 
issue before the Court was the criminal conviction of a teacher who 
taught German to a student in violation of Nebraska law.124 The Court 
attempted to define, if loosely, the meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s prohibition on government deprivation of “‘life, liberty 
or property without due process of law.’”125 
The Court offered a list of liberties that must be guaranteed under 
the broad dictates of the law.126 Included on the list were rights to 
“acquire useful knowledge,” the right to marry, the right to “establish 
a home and bring up children,” and more.127 The Court then focused 
the reasoning for its decision to overturn Mr. Meyer’s conviction on 
the “supreme importance” of the acquisition of knowledge and 
education, as well as the right of parents to control and educate their 
children.128 The right of a parent to raise a child, while on the list of 
rights that the Due Process Clause protects from undue government 
interference, was not specifically part of the Court’s reasoning for 
overturning the conviction of Mr. Meyer.129 It would appear the notion 
                                                                                                                 
 122. Romana Kaleem, Comment, Towards the Recognition of a Parental Right of Companionship in 
Adult Children Under the Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process Clause, 35 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 1121, 1131 (2005) (“One of the first cases that dealt with familial substantive due process rights, 
Meyer v. Nebraska, recognized the right of a parent to control the upbringing of his or her children.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 396–97. 
 125. Id. at 399. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 400–01. 
 129. See generally id. 
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that parental rights were protected by the Due Process Clause was, at 
this point in the Court’s jurisprudence, dicta. 
The Court’s assertion, albeit perhaps legally weak, that the Due 
Process Clause protected a person’s right to “establish a home and 
bring up children” continued seeping into other areas of the parent-
child relationship. Two years after deciding Meyer v. Nebraska, in 
1925, the Court decided Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy 
Names of Jesus and Mary, which also addressed parents’ rights to 
make educational decisions for their children.130 This time the issue 
was whether an Oregon statute that required parents to send their 
children to public school complied with the Due Process Clause.131 
The two appellees, Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus 
and Mary and Hill Military Academy, were not parents seeking rights 
to direct and control the upbringing and education of their children.132 
Again, the Court was asked to rule on the constitutionality of an issue 
that only indirectly affected the rights of parents.133 
The Court was faced with deciding whether the appellees, who were 
corporations whose purpose was to educate children, could assert a due 
process right to protect their property interests in their schools and 
businesses.134 The Court held the Constitution protected their property 
interests and ruled the lower court decision in favor of the appellees 
should stand.135 The lower court held several things, including that 
appellees had a protected property right in conducting their schools, 
which could not be invaded without due process of law.136 Primarily, 
the lower court reasoned that the liberty interest at stake held by the 
schools prohibited improper state interference with their right to 
operate.137 Though finding that “in the proper sense” corporations 
cannot claim a liberty interest in the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
                                                                                                                 
 130. See generally Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
 131. Id. at 529–31, 534. 
 132. Id. at 531–33; see generally Soc’y of Sisters v. Pierce, 296 F. 928 (D. Or. 1924), aff’d, 268 U.S. 
510 (1925). 
 133. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 531–33; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 398–99. 
 134. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535–36. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 533–34. 
 137. See Soc’y of Sisters, 296 F. at 936–38. 
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Supreme Court nevertheless agreed with the lower court’s reasoning 
that the “right to conduct schools was property and that parents and 
guardians, as a part of their liberty, might direct the education of 
children by selecting reputable teachers and places.”138 
The Court then set the Pierce decision squarely atop the decision in 
Meyer v. Nebraska, stating that it would rely upon the “doctrine of 
Meyer v. Nebraska” to reason that the statute in question interfered 
with the “liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and 
education of children under their control.”139 The Pierce Court did not 
mention that Meyer was a case between a teacher and the state about 
his criminal conviction for teaching material he had a constitutional 
right to teach.140 The Pierce Court’s mention of Meyer was in the 
context of what it called a “doctrine” in Meyer that protected the liberty 
of parents to direct and control the upbringing of their children.141 
Even though Pierce also did not directly confront the issue of parents’ 
constitutional rights to raise their children, history has focused on the 
decision as a parents’ rights decision, not a schools’ rights decision.142 
So, the Supreme Court appeared to have splashed loudly into the 
relatively calm fundamental substantive due process rights water when 
it recognized the constitutional rights of parents in two cases that 
involved no parent litigants at all. 
The Court recognized a person’s constitutional right to be treated 
equally under the law and not subject to forced sterilization in 1942 
with its decision in Skinner v. Oklahoma.143 The Court struck an 
Oklahoma statute requiring persons who had two or more “moral 
turpitude” felony convictions to be sterilized because the requirement 
                                                                                                                 
 138. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534–35. 
 139. Id. 
 140. See id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. See Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 447 F.3d 1187, 1189–90 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Brad J. 
Davidson, Comment, Balancing Parental Choice, State Interest, and the Establishment Clause: 
Constitutional Guidelines for States’ School-Choice Legislation, 33 TEX. TECH L. REV. 435, 445 (2002) 
(“Meyer and Pierce are recognized as the seminal cases declaring the constitutional right of parents to 
direct the education and upbringing of their children.”); Steven J. Macias, The Huck Finn Syndrome in 
History and Theory: The Origins of Family Privacy, 12 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 87, 92 (2010). 
 143. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
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violated the Equal Protection Clause.144 Because the act characterized 
some felonies, such as robbery, as crimes of “moral turpitude” but not 
other felonies, such as embezzlement, the Court held that the statute 
could not survive equal protection scrutiny.145 Targeting certain types 
of, but not all, felonious behavior as so morally repugnant that the 
perpetrator must be barred from procreating was a clear violation of 
the Equal Protection Clause.146 But, the Court declined to declare that 
persons have a fundamental right to procreation. 
The Petitioner challenged the Oklahoma statute on several 
constitutional grounds, including the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.147 The Court explicitly refused to decide the 
case on those grounds and instead focused on the inequities on the face 
of the statute.148 The Court did acknowledge the depth of importance 
of “one of the basic civil rights of man[,]” that is, the right to 
procreate.149 And, even though the Court went on to say that 
“[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and 
survival of the race[,]” it refrained from declaring procreation as a 
fundamental right that is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.150 
Although there are obvious distinctions between the right to procreate 
and the right to raise a child, in the overwhelming majority of 
instances, one flows naturally and appropriately into the other, and a 
declaration of procreation as a fundamental constitutional right in 
Skinner may have given lower courts a much earlier clarification on 
how much deference to parents’ rights the Constitution affords. 
Marching forward in its flirtation with fundamental parental rights, 
the Court next considered Prince v. Massachusetts in 1944.151 The 
Court characterized the case as yet “another episode in the conflict 
between Jehovah’s Witnesses and state authority[,]” which required 
review of state authority to invade a person’s exercise of her religious 
                                                                                                                 
 144. Id. at 536, 541–43. 
 145. Id. at 539, 541. 
 146. Id. at 541. 
 147. Id. at 537–38. 
 148. Id. at 538. 
 149. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541. 
 150. See id. 
 151. See generally Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
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convictions.152 The issue of parental rights was implicated by the facts 
in the case; namely, that Sarah Prince was distributing religious 
material in the evening with her nine-year-old charge, Betty Simmons, 
for whom Ms. Prince served as a guardian, in violation of several 
Massachusetts child labor laws.153 The Court considered Ms. Prince’s 
arguments that the statute forbidding child labor was invalid because 
it violated the child’s, Miss Betty Simmons, First Amendment rights 
to religious freedom and because it violated Ms. Prince’s Fourteenth 
Amendment right to parent Miss Betty Simmons.154 The Court treaded 
carefully into the analysis of the overlapping constitutional interests 
here, those of a citizen’s freedom of religion as well as a parent’s right 
to parent. 
The Court started with the discussion of whether a constitutional 
right to parent, particularly in the context of allowing a child to 
exercise her religious freedoms, can be invaded by the state.155 And 
while the Court determined that such an invasion was proper in narrow 
circumstances to protect children, it discussed the care states should 
use when considering treading on parental rights in the context of 
religious practice: “On one side is the obviously earnest claim for 
freedom of conscience and religious practice. With it is allied the 
parent’s claim to authority in her own household and in the rearing of 
her children.”156 The Court did not stray far from the consideration of 
a parent’s right to direct and control the religious upbringing of her 
child and chose to consider the more narrow issue rather than fully 
commit the Court to the broader proposition that parents have 
fundamental rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to raise their 
children.157 And in this case, the Court ultimately decided that Ms. 
Prince’s right as a guardian to decide how to allow her charge to 
practice her religion could be trumped by the child labor laws at 
issue.158 And so, the question of whether parents had a fundamental 
                                                                                                                 
 152. Id. at 159–60. 
 153. Id. at 159–60, 162. 
 154. Id. at 164. 
 155. Id. at 165. 
 156. Id. 
 157. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 165–67. 
 158. See id. at 170–71. 
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right to raise their children continued to remain unanswered. 
The Court considered many other challenges by parents to the 
authority of the state to dictate their parental rights after Prince v. 
Massachusetts. In some cases, the Court protected parents from 
unconstitutional interference by the state, and in others like Prince, the 
Court permitted the state to draw lines with respect to how parents 
were permitted to raise their children.159 The line of cases that 
extended from the Court’s first foray into delimiting parents’ rights in 
Meyer v. Nebraska focused on the limits of parents’ power to make 
decisions about how to raise their children. The most recent case where 
the Court was asked to determine the constitutional rights in the 
context of parents’ rights to make parenting decisions came in 2000, 
when it decided a case about the rights of third parties to seek court 
ordered visitation with children. 
In Troxel v. Granville, the paternal grandparents of two children 
sought to increase the amount of time they spent with their 
grandchildren after their son, the father of the children, committed 
suicide.160 The grandparents relied on a Washington state law that gave 
third parties the right to seek visitation with any child with whom they 
wanted to spend time.161 The Court reviewed the constitutionality of 
the law in light of its earlier declaration in Santosky v. Kramer, in 
which the Court recognized that parents have a fundamental right to 
retain the custody of their children unless the state can show clear and 
convincing evidence that the right should be invaded.162 The Court in 
Troxel applied the strict fundamental right standard and struck the 
Washington statute as impermissibly stepping on the parent’s 
constitutional right to the care and control of her children.163 The Court 
held that, in giving the right to third parties to seek visitation, 
Washington had created standing in court for any individual to 
                                                                                                                 
 159. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–66 (2000); cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 
(1923). 
 160. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 66. See infra Part I.C.2. Santosky was the first case in which the Supreme Court recognized 
a fundamental parental right; in that case it was the right of parents to retain custody of their children. 
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). 
 163. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72–73. 
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interfere with a parent’s right to decide with whom her children can 
spend time.164 
Troxel was the first case to declare that parents’ rights to the care 
and control of their children are fundamental.165 Santosky, which was 
decided eighteen years earlier, focused on the question of whether a 
parent’s custodial rights could be terminated at a low evidentiary 
standard and was less about how the parents in the case parented their 
children.166 Of course, underneath every decision about whether a 
parent should retain custody is a question of the parent’s ability to care 
for and control his or her child. The cases about the care and control 
of children, on the other hand, do not necessarily require an analysis 
of whether it is appropriate for the parent to retain custody.167 Perhaps 
the cases about parents’ rights to direct and control the upbringing of 
their children were not perceived high stakes enough to warrant a 
discussion by the Court about fundamental rights, but the statute at 
issue in Troxel finally pushed the Court over, in the context of parents’ 
rights to direct and control their children, that fundamental rights edge. 
The Court in Troxel may not have recognized its predecessor 
Courts’ reticence to call the rights of parents to direct and control their 
children a fundamental right, or it may not have wanted to 
acknowledge how long it took to officially name the right, but either 
way, the Court in Troxel stated that parents’ rights have been 
recognized as fundamental for a lot longer than perhaps was 
accurate.168 The Troxel majority deftly weaved fundamental liberty 
language into its discussion of the precedent: 
The liberty interest at issue in this case—the interest of parents in 
the care, custody, and control of their children—is perhaps the 
oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this 
Court. More than 75 years ago, in Meyer v. Nebraska, we held that 
                                                                                                                 
 164. Id. 
 165. See id. at 65. 
 166. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 768–70. 
 167. All of the cases in this Section are about parents’ rights to make decisions regarding their children’s 
educational opportunities or religious upbringing. Those cases were not analyzed as situations in which 
abuse or neglect were at issue. 
 168. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65–66. 
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the “liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause includes the 
right of parents to “establish a home and bring up children” and 
“to control the education of their own.”169 
Regardless of the Court’s reasoning for waiting so long to officially 
recognize the right, and regardless of the Court’s reasoning for its 
retroactive recognition of the right, the Court had finally declared it. 
When parents’ rights are at stake, either custodial or the rights to direct 
and control their children’s upbringing, the states must take great care 
to avoid unconstitutional interference with them. And even though it 
was recognized first, parents’ fundamental right to retain custody of 
their children had its own somewhat difficult path to fruition. 
2.   The Constitutional Right to Retain Custody 
In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham County, 
N.C.,170 the Court was asked to determine whether the protections for 
criminal defendants in the Due Process Clause to have assistance of 
counsel when their freedom was at stake extended to parents at risk of 
losing their parental rights.171 The Court recognized an important 
interest in the rights of parents to the custody of their children,172 but 
stopped short of drawing a direct comparison of those rights to the 
rights of criminal defendants at risk of losing their personal freedom.173 
And even though the Court acknowledged the importance of the right 
to parent in that context, the Court stopped short of stating directly that 
parents have fundamental rights to parent under the Due Process 
Clause.174 It was not until a year later, in Santosky v. Kramer, that the 
Court was willing to make that declaration. In Santosky, the Court was 
asked to consider the constitutionality of the evidentiary standards 
applied when adjudicating parents’ right to custody, and in that 
                                                                                                                 
 169. Id. (citation omitted). 
 170. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981). 
 171. Id. at 24. 
 172. Id. at 27. 
 173. See id. at 31–32. 
 174. See generally id. 
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context, the Court finally declared the fundamental right to parent.175 
Santosky afforded the Court the opportunity to clarify the 
evidentiary standard used to determine whether parents should retain 
custody of their children.176 Before then, the standard fluctuated from 
state to state because each allegation of child abuse or neglect 
presented unique facts that were then applied to different legal 
standards.177 It has always been within the states’ purview to determine 
what constitutes proper parenting according to community 
standards.178 What the Court eventually ruled constitutionally 
impermissible, however, was the lack of consistency among the 
evidentiary standards states applied to each adjudication of allegations 
of parental misconduct.179 
In Santosky, the Court articulated clearly, for the first time, the 
evidentiary standard required by the Due Process Clause to terminate 
parental rights.180 The parents in Santosky, John and Annie Santosky, 
were accused of parental neglect of one of their children, Tina, who 
was removed from their home.181 Ten months later, their son, John was 
also removed from the home, which also happened to be the same day 
Annie Santosky gave birth to another son, Jed.182 When Jed was three 
days old, he was transferred to a foster home upon allegations that his 
                                                                                                                 
 175. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747–48, 753 (1982). 
 176. Id. 
 177. Some states adopted the clear and convincing standard. See, e.g., In re C.G., 637 P.2d 66, 70–71 
(Okla. 1981) (“The clear-and-convincing standard balances the parents’ fundamental freedom from family 
disruption with the state’s duty to protect children within its borders. It places an appropriately heavy 
burden upon the . . . petitioner (termination-seeking party) to overcome the law’s policy which identifies 
the child’s best interest with that of its natural parents.”). But cf. Custody of Minor, 389 N.E.2d 68, 74–
75 (Mass. 1979). The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts expressly rejected the clear and 
convincing standard. Id. Instead, the court followed an approach that provided the judge discretion when 
weighing the evidence. Id. (“We think it undesirable, however, to adopt the mother’s suggestion that we 
require ‘clear and convincing’ proof in cases of the kind presented here . . . We prefer to take the position 
that the personal rights . . . require the judge to exercise the utmost care in promulgating custody awards.”). 
 178. See, e.g., United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966) (“Both theory and the precedents of 
this Court teach us solicitude for state interests, particularly in the field of family . . . .”); Prince v. 
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944) (“Acting to guard the general interest in youth’s well being, 
the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent’s control by requiring school attendance, regulating or 
prohibiting the child’s labor, and in many other ways.”). 
 179. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 768–70. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 751. 
 182. Id. 
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life would be in imminent danger if he were permitted to stay with his 
parents.183 After an adjudication hearing where the judge applied a 
“fair preponderance of the evidence” standard to the question of 
whether the Santoskys were fit parents, the judge terminated their 
parental rights.184 
The Supreme Court took the case on appeal to determine whether 
the “fair preponderance of the evidence” standard satisfied the Due 
Process Clause and adequately protected parents from state 
interference with their rights to custody.185 The Court then clearly 
stated, for the first time, that the rights of parents to “freedom of 
personal choice in matters of family life” was a “fundamental liberty 
interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”186 The Court went 
on to say that the “fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the 
care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate 
simply because they have not been model parents or have lost 
temporary custody of their child to the State.”187 Interestingly, the 
Court in Santosky, for the first time, wrapped parents’ rights to the 
care, control, and maintenance of their children together with their 
right to retain custody of their children. It seems that the increased 
level of severity of the termination of parental rights gave the Court 
the opportunity to articulate that a fundamental right to parent exists. 
The Court reasoned that when parents have lost custody of their 
children to the state pending termination proceedings, the standards to 
protect their constitutional rights are even more important than those 
at stake for parents who are subject to state scrutiny for their parenting 
but have retained their custody rights.188 These considerations are 
crucial to keep in mind when discussing the current regime 
encouraging rapid termination of parental rights.189 
Based on the facts of Santosky, the Court did not need to include in 
                                                                                                                 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 751–52. 
 185. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 749–52. 
 186. Id. at 753. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. (“If anything, persons faced with forced dissolution of their parental rights have a more critical 
need for procedural protections than do those resisting state intervention into ongoing family affairs.”). 
 189. See infra Part III. 
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its recognition that parents have fundamental rights to direct and 
control the upbringing of their children.190 The higher stakes in 
Santosky could have been distinguished from the earlier parents’ rights 
cases because the Santoskys’ parental rights had been terminated.191 In 
Meyer, Pierce, Prince, and other cases preceding Santosky, the Court 
was asked to determine whether the state could dictate how parents 
raise their children, not whether they should be allowed to raise them 
at all.192 Once a fundamental right to custody was declared, however, 
it presumably would have been very difficult to disentangle the 
obviously interwoven considerations of parents’ rights to manage the 
upbringing of their children. 
Of particular importance, when analyzing how the fundamental 
right to parent can be invaded by the state, is the Court’s decision to 
apply the strict “clear and convincing evidence” standard for 
terminating parental rights.193 The Santosky Court looked closely at 
the process used by the State of New York to permanently terminate 
parental rights and determined that evaluating the case on a 
“preponderance of the evidence” standard provided inadequate due 
process.194 The Court, however, declined to require that states prove 
“beyond a reasonable doubt” that parental rights should be terminated, 
as is required by the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA).195 
Congress reasoned that an Indian parent’s rights to parent his or her 
child should not be permanently severed without evidence showing the 
termination was necessary “beyond a reasonable doubt.”196 
Congress, in passing the ICWA, reasoned that the “beyond a 
reasonable doubt” evidentiary standard was necessary because 
terminating parental rights “‘is a penalty as great [as], if not greater, 
than a criminal penalty.’”197 In the years before Congress passed the 
                                                                                                                 
 190. See generally Santosky, 455 U.S. 745. 
 191. Id. at 751. 
 192. See supra notes 118–25, 130–33, 151–58 and accompanying text. 
 193. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769–70. 
 194. Id. at 768. 
 195. Id. at 750–51, 768–70. 
 196. See id. at 750–51. 
 197. Id. at 769 (alteration in original) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 22 (1978), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7545). 
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ICWA, an epidemic of hyper-interventionism was gripping child 
protection authorities on Native American reservations.198 When the 
parental rights of Native Americans were terminated (often for flimsy 
reasons that could not satisfy even a low standard of proof), their 
Native American children were placed with, and often adopted by, 
non-Native families living off the reservation.199 This practice was so 
common and percentages of children leaving the reservation 
permanently so high that activists called upon Congress to 
intervene.200 In hopes of preserving the culture of Native Americans, 
Congress changed the standard of proof for terminating parental rights 
to the highest there is, beyond a reasonable doubt, and made it very 
difficult to remove children from reservations.201 The standard of proof 
for non-Native American parental rights termination, however, 
remains the less demanding clear and convincing evidence.202 
The concern for preserving cultural integrity on Indian reservations 
was real and Congress addressed that concern, in part, by requiring a 
strict standard of proof to terminate parental rights of Native American 
parents.203 Congress justified its actions in passing the stricter standard 
by stating, in legislative history, that losing parental rights can be as 
punishing as (or perhaps more than) criminal penalties.204 The 
motivation to evaluate the standard of proof applied to Native 
American parents at risk of losing their parental rights was rooted in 
the concern about cultural bias against Native parents, which was 
                                                                                                                 
 198. See Cheyañna L. Jaffke, Judicial Indifference: Why Does the “Existing Indian Family” Exception 
to the Indian Child Welfare Act Continue to Endure?, 38 W. ST. U. L. REV. 127, 129–30 (2011); see also 
H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 9 (“Surveys of states with large Indian populations conducted by the 
Association on American Indian Affairs (AAIA) in 1969 and again in 1974 indicate that approximately 
25–35 percent of all Indian children are separated from their families and placed in foster homes, adoptive 
homes, or institutions.”). 
 199. Jaffke, supra note 198, at 130. ICWA’s congressional findings state that “an alarmingly high 
percentage of Indian families are broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their children from 
them by nontribal public and private agencies and that an alarmingly high percentage of such children are 
placed in non-Indian foster and adoptive homes and institutions.” 25 U.S.C. § 1901(4) (2012). 
 200. Sarah Martinez, Turning Back the Clock: The Loss of Tribal Jurisdiction Over Involuntary 
Juvenile Dependency Proceedings, 10 U. C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 541, 541–42 (2006). 
 201. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f). 
 202. Brian C. Hill, Comment, The State’s Burden of Proof at the Best Interests Stage of a Termination 
of Parental Rights, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 557, 559 (2004). 
 203. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901(3), 1912(f); see also H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 22. 
 204. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 22. 
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appropriate and necessary.205 The absence of the motivation to stem 
cultural family destruction, however, does not change how stiff the 
penalty of losing parental rights can be. If the loss of parental rights is 
a heavy burden for Native American parents to bear, it is an equally 
heavy burden for all parents to bear. 
Perhaps the context of the shockingly high rate of parental rights 
terminations of Native American parents and adoptions of children 
from Indian reservations provided a unique lens through which 
Congress could view parental rights. Instead of evaluating the process 
of parental rights termination from the perspective of children believed 
to be at risk, Congress was forced to evaluate the process through the 
eyes of the parents faced with losing their children to the state and then 
to strangers. That context may have spurred Congress to take decisive 
action to protect parents’ rights, which is not often the path Congress 
follows when considering legislation that affects parents and children. 
Despite its rightful concern for procedural safeguards for Native 
American parental rights, Congress has prioritized procedures that 
value efficiency and finality over careful consideration and protection 
of parental rights for all other parents. This congressional drive for 
efficiency culminated most recently in the Adoption and Safe Families 
Act, which has, over the sixteen years since its enactment, encouraged 
states to speed their procedures for parental rights termination to 
constitutionally impermissible rates.206 
II.   ATTEMPTS BY CONGRESS AND THE STATES TO SEEK PERMANENCE 
FOR CHILDREN WHO HAVE BEEN REMOVED FROM THEIR PARENTS’ 
CUSTODY 
The evolution of a balance between protecting children from 
abusive parents and protecting parents from undue state interference 
with their right to parent, may have reached equilibrium sometime 
                                                                                                                 
 205. Barbara Ann Atwood, Flashpoints Under the Indian Child Welfare Act: Toward a New 
Understanding of State Court Resistance, 51 EMORY L.J. 587, 661–62 (2002). 
 206. Mary O’Flynn, Comment, The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997: Changing Child Welfare 
Policy Without Addressing Parental Substance Abuse, 16 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 243, 265 
(1999). 
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around the time Santosky v. Kramer was decided by the Supreme Court 
in 1982. At that point, the problems of child abuse and neglect were 
well known and acknowledged at every level of government and were 
addressed in legislation in every state, albeit with varying success rates 
of saving children from horrible home situations.207 Also, as discussed 
in Section I.C.2., supra, the Supreme Court recognized that the 
solution to the problem of child abuse could not include 
unconstitutional intervention.208 Of course, many may disagree that 
there ever was, or could ever be, equilibrium when it comes to 
balancing children’s and parents’ rights, but if it existed at all in the 
early 1980s, it was about to come to an end. In 1997, Congress passed 
the Adoption and Safe Families Act, which not only made it more 
difficult for parents accused of abuse or neglect to retain or regain 
custody of their children but also put children at increased risk of 
psychological harm by removing them from perhaps imperfect, but 
ultimately better than the alternative (orphan status), homes.209 
A.   The Purpose Behind the Adoption and Safe Families Act 
In passing the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA), Congress 
intended to “promote the adoption of children in foster care.”210 
Congress was concerned with statistics indicating that children who 
are placed in foster care because their parents were accused of abuse 
or neglect were spending significant portions of their childhood in the 
foster care system and sought to expedite the process of terminating 
parental rights to free those children for adoption.211 Children in foster 
care before ASFA could be hanging in the balance between their 
parents and a permanent placement with an adoptive family for an 
extended period of time, sometimes for years.212 A lack of permanence 
for those children was considered extremely detrimental to them and 
                                                                                                                 
 207. Laura Oren, The State’s Failure to Protect Children and Substantive Due Process: Deshaney in 
Context, 68 N.C. L. REV. 659, 666–67 (1990). 
 208. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). 
 209. See O’Flynn, supra note 206, at 251, 265. 
 210. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2006)). 
 211. H.R. REP. NO. 105-77, at 8 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2739, 2740, 1997 WL 225672. 
 212. Id. at 8–9. 
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studies showed that the uncertainty of their situation could cause great 
anxiety and frustration among foster children.213 The negative impacts 
of being in limbo for a long time were considered damaging enough to 
outweigh the potential benefits of eventually reuniting children with 
their rehabilitated parents.214 
In passing ASFA, Congress placed a significant emphasis on cutting 
the amount of time it takes for states to terminate parental rights of 
biological or legal parents and free children for adoption.215 A 
necessary first step to reducing the amount of time children spend in 
foster care is to sever the rights of their parents, permanently cutting 
off parents’ rights to legal and physical custody of their children. Once 
parental rights are terminated, courts may freely finalize adoptions of 
children who are fortunate enough to have prospective adoptive 
parents.216 The purpose behind, and the language in, ASFA aims to 
expedite the process of parental rights termination so as to give those 
prospective adoptive parents a clear opportunity to move forward with 
adoption.217 More importantly, the aim is to give children in the foster 
care system a sense of stability by securing permanent placements for 
them as quickly as possible.218 
B.   How ASFA Works 
Congress intended for ASFA to provide a set of statutory principles 
                                                                                                                 
 213. See O’Flynn, supra note 206, at 251. In H.R. REP. NO. 105-77, the Ways and Means Committee 
stated that “[t]here seems to be almost universal agreement that adoption is preferable to foster care and 
that the nation’s children would be well served by a policy that increases adoption rates.” H.R. REP. NO. 
105-77, at 8. 
 214. See generally Lenore M. McWey & Ann K. Mullins, Improving the Lives of Children in Foster 
Care: The Impact of Supervised Visitation, FAM. REL., Apr. 2004, at 293–300. The study examined 
children ages from birth to eighteen that were placed in a foster care facility. Id. at 295. The study 
concluded that “for families in which reunification is a goal, young children who have more consistent 
and frequent contact with their biological parents have more secure attachments and are better adjusted 
than children who have less contact.” Id. at 297; accord Richard Wexler, Take the Child and Run: Tales 
from the Age of ASFA, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 129, 136–41 (2001) (summarizing studies that indicate 
family preservation is superior to foster care). 
 215. H.R. REP. NO. 105-77, at 13. 
 216. See id. at 23. 
 217. See id. at 8 (“[W]hat is needed is a measured response to allow States to adjust their statutes and 
practices so that in some circumstances States will be able to move more efficiently toward terminating 
parental rights and placing children for adoption.”). 
 218. See id. 
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that states can implement for the reward of federal grant dollars.219 It 
requires that states seek approval of their plan by the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services.220 The Secretary will ensure that the 
state’s plan complies with ASFA requirements before the state can 
receive any funding under the statute, meaning states must devise 
procedures to ensure that state child welfare agencies move forward 
with permanency planning within twelve months after children are 
removed from their homes and placed in foster care.221 While the 
scheme provides a possibility for extension of the permanency 
planning stage, doing so can only be achieved if the state documents a 
compelling reason for extension of temporary placement.222 And in 
some circumstances, states are not required to wait even twelve months 
to seek permanency planning.223 States that delay the process of 
achieving permanency for children in the foster care system are at risk 
of losing federal grant money in the future.224 
The provisions of ASFA essentially have encouraged states to 
truncate the process of evaluating parental fitness. It does so in two 
ways. First, in the permanency planning provision, it seeks to shorten 
the amount of time states are required to make reasonable efforts to 
reunify children in foster care with their parents.225 Second, in certain 
circumstances, the reasonable efforts provision exception seeks to 
eliminate altogether the reasonable efforts requirement and shortens 
the time the state must wait to seek termination of parental rights to 
thirty days.226 The permanency planning provision is not as restrictive 
as the exception to the reasonable efforts requirement, but it did seek 
to shorten the amount of time children spent in foster care, thereby 
limiting the amount of time parents had to show that they could 
conform to community standards of “good parenting.” 
                                                                                                                 
 219. See generally Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2006)). 
 220. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a). 
 221. Id. § 675(5)(C). 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. § 671(a)(15)(C). 
 224. See id. § 671(a)(1)-(33). 
 225. Id. § 671(a)(15)(C). 
 226. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(E). 
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1.   Expedited Permanency Planning Under ASFA 
The permanency planning provision of ASFA requires that states 
make a definitive move toward permanency for a child who has been 
in foster care for twelve months.227 At that point, the court must make 
a determination about whether the child should be placed back with 
his or her parents or whether the parents’ parental rights should be 
terminated.228 The provision does permit a court to continue the foster 
care relationship for some period of time if there are special 
circumstances that warrant the continuation.229 It is clear from the 
language and construction of the provision, though, that the possibility 
of extending the time in foster care for a child is not desirable and 
should be exercised rarely.230 In the twelve months between the child’s 
placement in foster care and the permanency hearing, the state is 
required to make reasonable efforts to “preserve and reunify” the 
family.231 
The reasonable efforts provision in ASFA is fairly short, but it 
makes clear that the state cannot ignore reunification as a goal for 
families who have been separated by abuse or neglect.232 The provision 
requires that “reasonable efforts shall be made to preserve and reunify 
families[,]” before or after the child has been removed from the 
home.233 But if those reasonable efforts are deemed inconsistent with 
the permanency plan set by the court for whatever reason, then the state 
must shift its reasonable efforts to those that would advance the 
finalization of the permanency plan.234 Reasonable efforts to preserve 
and unify families are only required as long as the court deems them 
consistent with the permanency plan.235 It is possible, then, that a 
permanency plan that is established within twelve months of the 
child’s placement into foster care could be deemed inconsistent with 
                                                                                                                 
 227. Id. § 675(5)(C). 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. § 671(15)(B); O’Flynn, supra note 206, at 247. 
 232. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(15)(B). 
 233. Id. § 671(15)(B)(i)-(ii). 
 234. Id. § 671(15)(C). 
 235. Id. 
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reasonable efforts to reunite the family, and at that point, the state is 
free to move forward as quickly as it can to sever family ties 
completely.236 
In this scenario, it is quite possible for a parent to lose rights to her 
child in the time span of twelve months. In twelve short months, a 
parent struggling enough to lose custody of her child must make 
significant improvements in her quality of life, including possibly 
ending an addiction, getting job training and employment, learning and 
implementing parenting skills (in the absence of having a child to 
parent), and perhaps much more. Not only must she do those things, 
she must do them to such a degree she can prove to a court that she is 
a good candidate to retain parental rights to her children and in only a 
short while after she has lost them. This task may prove 
insurmountable to someone who has many of the tools it takes to be a 
good parent but is struggling with only one of the life challenges that 
can confront parents from time to time. And though this provision may 
create a process that is so rushed it cannot pass procedural due process 
muster, the reasonable efforts exceptions are even more problematic. 
2.   Exception to Reasonable Efforts to Reunify a Family 
In drafting ASFA, Congress was not content to only encourage 
states to significantly speed the process of terminating parental rights 
in light of accusations of abuse and neglect. Congress went one step 
further by including exceptions to the reasonable efforts requirements, 
allowing states to skip altogether the process of assisting at-risk 
parents and children to stay together.237 This provision permits states, 
in certain enumerated circumstances, to forego any reasonable efforts 
to reunify the family and move to permanency planning within thirty 
days of determining that the reasonable efforts exception has been 
triggered.238 The exception specifically enumerates several 
circumstances in which reasonable efforts are not required.239 Several 
                                                                                                                 
 236. See id. 
 237. Id. § 671(15)(D). 
 238. 42 U.S.C. § 671(15)(D)–(E). 
 239. Id. § 671(15)(D). 
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of the categories may seem logical and necessary to most, but at least 
one is unconstitutionally efficient. 
Under ASFA, the state is not required to make reasonable efforts to 
reunite a parent with her child in three circumstances.240 First, 
reasonable efforts are not required if the parent has subjected the child 
to aggravated circumstances as defined by state law, though ASFA 
suggests to include “abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, and sexual 
abuse.”241 Additionally, a state can forego reasonable efforts if a parent 
has committed murder, attempted murder, or felony assault of the child 
or the child’s sibling.242 In the third category, the state may skip 
reasonable efforts to reunite a parent and child if the “parental rights 
of the parent to a sibling have been terminated involuntarily.”243 It is 
this category of exception to the reasonable efforts rule that most 
clearly flies in the face of the Due Process Clause. 
III.   CONSTITUTIONAL FLAWS OF STATE LAWS EXPEDITING 
TERMINATION OF RIGHTS 
In the years since ASFA was passed, states have fallen in line by 
passing and implementing their own versions of the statute.244 
Incentives in hand, states have been busily relying on statutes to 
expedite the process of seeking permanence for children in foster care 
by terminating parental rights at a faster pace than before ASFA.245 
There have been other problems identified with the passage of ASFA 
                                                                                                                 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. § 671(15)(D)(i). 
 242. Id. § 671(15)(D)(ii). 
 243. Id. § 671(15)(D)(iii). 
 244. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2271 (West, WestlawNext through 2013 Reg. and Sp. Sess.); W. VA. 
CODE ANN. § 49-6-5 (West, WestlawNext through 2013 First Extraordinary Sess.); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 2151.414 (West, WestlawNext through 2013 Files 24 and 26 to 38 of the 130th Gen. Assembly). 
 245. Hilary Baldwin, Termination of Parental Rights: Statistical Study and Proposed Solutions, 28 J. 
LEGIS. 239, 269–75 (2002). Baldwin looked at all parental termination cases in St. Josephs County, 
Indiana and found that there were more parental terminations after the passage of the Adoption and Safe 
Families Act. Id. at 273–75. A magistrate judge in Michigan wrote a piece that included empirical 
evidence showing the unintended negative results of ASFA and accompanying state legislation passed to 
expedite the termination of parental rights: a spike in the number of state-created orphans with few or no 
adoption prospects. Kenneth L. Tacoma, Lost and Alone on Some Forgotten Highway: ASFA, Binsfeld, 
and the Law of Unintended Consequences 1–2 (Dec. 2005), http://courts.mi.gov/Administration/SCAO/ 
OfficesPrograms/Documents/fcrb/Tacoma.pdf. 
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that have arisen since states adopted versions of it, including creating 
a whole new class of orphans and teenagers who need to be legally 
emancipated and find a way to live on their own.246 But the most 
pressing constitutional problem with the statute has been the interplay 
between state practices for removing newborns from their parents’ 
custody within days of birth if the parents have previously lost parental 
rights to a sibling of the newborn.247 Coupled with the general 
expedited process to terminate parental rights, ASFA has essentially 
incentivized states to sever the rights of these parents with far less than 
the constitutionally required clear and convincing evidence standard. 
A.   Expedited Process of Parental Rights Termination After a Prior 
Involuntary Termination 
The exception in ASFA allowing states to forego reasonable 
reunification efforts for parents who have previously lost rights to 
another child is the second of three steps that end in an unconstitutional 
process for persons falling into a somewhat common parental rights 
termination scenario. The first step starts in the hospital when a mother 
who has lost parental rights before gives birth. In many states, when a 
mother already divested of rights to one child gives birth to another, 
the state is notified of the birth.248 In these cases, before the mother is 
permitted to leave the hospital, the state removes the newborn from her 
custody on the assumption that the earlier adjudication terminating her 
parental rights requires the newborn be protected from his or her 
                                                                                                                 
 246. Tacoma, supra note 245, at 3–4. 
 247. See infra note 248. 
 248. See, e.g., Padgett v. Dep’t of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So. 2d 565, 567 (Fla. 1991) 
(“[T]wo days after W.L.P. was born, HRS filed a petition for detention of W.L.P. based on the fact that 
Mary Padgett 1) had recently given birth to a child who was placed in HRS custody . . . .”); In re T.T.: 
S.T. v. Harrison Cnty. Dep’t of Human Servs., 90 So. 3d 1283, 1284 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (“On August 
5, 2010, DHS received an alert of potential abuse from Biloxi Regional Hospital stating S.T. was in the 
hospital to give birth to a child. The hospital had received an alert from the Mobile, Alabama, Department 
of Human Resources (DHR) stating S.T. had two other children already in the custody of DHR, and DHR 
felt it was important for the newborn to be safe and free from abuse. On August 8, 2010, DHS picked up 
T.T. . . . from the hospital and placed him in foster care.”); In re West, No. 05CA4, 2005 WL 1400029, 
at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. June 10, 2005) (“On September 27, 2004, appellant gave birth to General H. West, 
Jr. On September 28, 2004, ACCS filed a complaint that alleged the child to be neglected and dependent 
and requested permanent custody.”). 
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mother.249 At that point step two commences, which relieves the state 
of any responsibility to make reasonable efforts to reunify the mother 
with her newborn.250 Step three also comes from ASFA, which 
requires the state to have a permanency hearing within thirty days of 
the newborn’s removal and to make reasonable efforts for finalization 
of the permanency plan.251 
It is a common practice among agencies charged with protecting 
children from abusive parents to preemptively remove newborns from 
the custody of parents who have previously lost parental rights to a 
sibling of the newborn.252 When a woman whose parental rights have 
been involuntarily terminated in the past gives birth again in a hospital, 
the child protection agency in that jurisdiction is notified of the 
birth.253 The agency will typically remove the child from the custody 
of his or her mother before she can leave the hospital with her new 
baby.254 If a baby is not born in the hospital, child protection agencies 
will remove the child as soon as they are notified of the birth. There 
are obvious safeguards built into this system, all based on the 
assumption that the mother of the child has a track record that makes 
her too much of a risk to allow her to care for her newborn.255 
In this scenario, which is actually not uncommon, the newborn has 
been removed as a matter of course, without any determination that the 
newborn’s parents have engaged in any abusive or neglectful behavior. 
In fact, because the newborns are removed within a few hours to a few 
days of their birth, it would take concerted effort on the parents’ part 
to engage in abusive or neglectful behavior in the heavily supervised 
and protective environment of a maternity and infant ward. At this 
point, the reasonable efforts exception takes effect. It is not clear, 
based on the language of the statute, exactly how states should 
implement the provision, but the statute does make clear that it is not 
                                                                                                                 
 249. See supra note 248. 
 250. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(iii) (2006). 
 251. Id. § 671(a)(15)(E)(i). 
 252. See, e.g., Padgett, 577 So. 2d at 567; In re T.T.: S.T., 90 So. 3d at 1284; In re West, 2005 WL 
1400029, at *1. 
 253. See In re T.T.: S.T., 90 So. 3d at 1284. 
 254. See id. 
 255. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D). 
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necessary to make reasonable efforts to reunify the parents and their 
newborn.256 The reasonable efforts exception can be read two ways, 
neither of which ends well for parents who hope to regain custody of 
their newborn child. 
The language of the reasonable efforts exception is ambiguous 
about how it should be implemented. The relevant portion of the 
provision states: “(D) reasonable efforts . . . shall not be required to be 
made with respect to a parent of a child if a court of competent 
jurisdiction has determined that . . . (iii) the parental rights of the parent 
to a sibling have been terminated involuntarily.”257 On one hand, the 
provision could mean that only after a court of competent jurisdiction 
has determined the parent was subject to involuntary termination of 
parental rights in the past, regardless of whether a court or other state 
agency terminated the parental rights, can reasonable efforts to reunify 
the family be disregarded. On the other, it could mean the reasonable 
efforts exception is applicable only if a court of competent jurisdiction 
has terminated the parents’ rights to a sibling of the newborn at issue 
now.258 In that case, the child protection agency would only need to 
know of the prior involuntary termination (and of course it would 
because the knowledge of the prior termination of parental rights is 
what alerts the agency to remove the newborn in the first place) to 
determine for itself that it need not make reasonable efforts to reunify 
the family. 
Even if a hearing is required to determine whether reasonable efforts 
can be skipped by the agency, the court does not appear to have 
discretion under ASFA to determine that reasonable efforts should be 
made.259 The statute states that reasonable efforts to reunify families 
“shall not be required to be made” when parents have lost their rights 
                                                                                                                 
 256. Id. § 671(a)(15)(D)(iii). 
 257. Id. 
 258. At least one child protection agency determined the provision did not require a court to make the 
decision that reasonable efforts were not required. In re Div. of Family Servs. v. James, 28 A.3d 480, 
480–81 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2009). In that case, the Division of Family Services filed a motion in Family Court 
averring that the Division, not the court, was the proper entity to determine that, because the mother had 
involuntarily lost parental rights to a child in the past, ASFA did not require reasonable reunification 
efforts. Id. However, the court disagreed that the Division was the appropriate decision maker. Id. 
 259. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15). 
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previously.260 The court hearing, if there is one at all, is cursory, to 
confirm that a parent’s rights have been terminated involuntarily in the 
past.261 Either way, the determination that reasonable efforts are not 
required is not a rigorous evidentiary analysis of parenting ability. 
After whichever entity makes the determination that reasonable efforts 
to reunify the family are not required, a court must move the process 
along quickly to the next step.262 
As soon as the exception to the reasonable efforts requirement has 
been triggered, a court must start the permanency planning process.263 
In fact, a court is required to hold a permanency planning hearing 
within thirty days of the determination that reasonable efforts are not 
required.264 As soon as the permanency hearing is held, the state must 
begin making reasonable efforts to “place the child in a timely manner 
in accordance with the permanency plan, and to complete whatever 
steps are necessary to finalize the permanent placement of the 
child.”265 Within thirty days of the determination that reasonable 
efforts to reunify are not required, a court must set a permanency plan 
that must be implemented as quickly as possible.266 This rush to 
finality gives parents no opportunity to show they are fit parents with 
respect to their newborn child, and it allows courts to rely on an 
adjudication of unfitness in the past as evidence of unfitness in the 
future, which is a violation of the substantive and procedural due 
process rights of parents. 
B.   Due Process Flaws With States’ Implementation of ASFA 
The effect of this expedited process terminating parental rights is 
that parents do not have adequate constitutional protection to regain 
physical or legal custody of their children. It may be argued that the 
process is not constitutionally flawed because the parents who have 
                                                                                                                 
 260. Id. § 671(a)(15)(D). 
 261. See id. § 671(a)(15)(E). 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. § 671(a)(15)(E)(i). 
 265. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(E)(ii). 
 266. Id. § 671(a)(15)(E). 
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lost custody will have an opportunity to present evidence that they are 
capable of properly caring for their newborn at the hearing to set a 
permanency plan. The reasonable efforts exception and the rush to 
permanency in ASFA, however, are procedurally flawed in two 
fundamental ways. First, they allow evidence of a past adjudication of 
fitness to be used against a parent at a later hearing about a different 
child. Second, they are based on a presumption that once parents are 
deemed unfit to parent they are forever unfit, thereby requiring parents 
to prove, in a court of law, fitness to parent a later-born child. Those 
flaws have been incorporated into how states proceed in terminating 
parental rights and have resulted in unconstitutional practices that 
violate the substantive and procedural due process rights of parents. 
In Mathews v. Eldridge, the Court considered the question of how 
much procedural due process is required before a person’s liberty or 
property interests can be invaded by the state.267 Recognizing, of 
course, that not all liberty or property interests are the same, the Court 
devised a three part balancing test to help courts determine the 
appropriate level of caution when conducting a proceeding about the 
invasion of a person’s liberty or property interests.268 The first part of 
the test requires consideration of the private and government interests 
at stake in the proceeding.269 Next, the risk of error in applying the 
procedures already in place must be evaluated as well as how 
beneficial additional procedural safeguards would be.270 Last, courts 
evaluate the societal interest in avoiding potentially burdensome 
procedural safeguards.271 When applied, these factors weigh heavily in 
favor of more procedural safeguards in termination of parental rights 
hearings when a parent has involuntarily lost rights in the past. Later, 
when the Court decided Santosky v. Kramer, it relied partly upon 
Mathews to determine that higher procedural protections were 
constitutionally required in the context of protecting parents’ 
                                                                                                                 
 267. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332–34 (1976) (“Procedural due process imposes constraints 
on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within the 
meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 268. Id. at 339–41, 343, 347. 
 269. Id. at 339–41. 
 270. Id. at 343. 
 271. Id. at 347. 
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fundamental liberty interests in retaining custody of their children.272 
In Santosky v. Kramer, the Supreme Court determined that states 
may not terminate parental rights without clear and convincing 
evidence the termination was necessary to protect children from their 
parents.273 Thus, states seeking to terminate rights are required to 
include a procedure where proof that satisfies the high (although not 
the highest) standard of clear and convincing evidence is presented to, 
and evaluated by, the court.274 Justice Blackmun, writing for the 
majority, articulated the stakes for parents at risk of losing their 
parental rights: 
Even when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital 
interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family 
life. If anything, persons faced with forced dissolution of their 
parental rights have a more critical need for procedural protections 
than do those resisting state intervention into ongoing family 
affairs.275 
The Court in Santosky carefully evaluated what the standard of 
proof should be and concluded that a “preponderance of the evidence” 
standard was too low to protect a parent’s constitutional rights.276 
In Santosky, as stated in Part I.C.2., supra, the Supreme Court was 
very concerned with protecting the procedural and substantive due 
process rights of parents during termination of parental rights 
proceedings. The Court rejected a “preponderance of the evidence 
standard” as too low to protect a right that is “far more precious than 
any property right.”277 The Court reasoned: 
When the State initiates a parental rights termination proceeding, 
it seeks not merely to infringe that fundamental liberty interest, 
                                                                                                                 
 272. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754–62 (1982). 
 273. Id. at 769. 
 274. Id. at 769–70. 
 275. Id. at 753. 
 276. Id. at 768. 
 277. Id. at 758–59, 768. 
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but to end it. “If the State prevails, it will have worked a unique 
kind of deprivation . . . . A parent’s interest in the accuracy and 
justice of the decision to terminate his or her parental status is, 
therefore, a commanding one.”278 
Unfortunately, the requirements of ASFA, and the ways states have 
implemented them, have conspired to disregard parents’ fundamental 
liberty interest in retaining custody of their children and to reject the 
constitutional procedural safeguard of a high evidentiary standard for 
termination of parental rights. 
The constitutional problems with the expedited process in ASFA, as 
applied in the states, can arise most significantly in two ways. First, it 
allows the state to rely on evidence of abuse or neglect in the past to 
prove that abuse or neglect will happen in the future. Second, the 
process effectively shifts the burden of proof that someone is unfit 
from the state to parents, who must then prove they are fit to parent the 
child at issue. Both of these procedural requirements are inconsistent 
with the definition of due process and do not comply with the 
balancing test set out by the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge, 
and they both ignore the Santosky requirement that a state must prove 
by clear and convincing evidence that a parent is unfit.279 The first 
example of states’ unconstitutional application of ASFA-based 
provisions expediting the termination of parental rights is exhibited 
when states use evidence of past terminations to prove that termination 
is again necessary. 
1.   Use of Past Behavior to Prove That Future Bad Behavior Will 
Occur 
The Supreme Court in Santosky v. Kramer, in its determination that 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires states 
to prove by a “clear and convincing” evidence standard that 
termination of parental rights is necessary, relied on the balancing test 
in Mathews v. Eldridge to reason that a stricter standard of proof would 
                                                                                                                 
 278. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759 (quoting Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981)). 
 279. Id. at 769; Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 339–41, 343, 347 (1976). 
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not unconstitutionally burden the government.280 In Santosky, the 
Court took particular interest in the fact that the proceedings against 
the parents in question were very similar to criminal proceedings.281 
The state presented evidence against the parents in accordance with 
formal rules of evidence, each party was represented by counsel, the 
state established facts about the family’s willingness or unwillingness 
to participate in reunification efforts, the parties called and cross-
examined witnesses, and the court made a determination based on the 
evidence.282 This similarity to a criminal trial was an important 
consideration for the Court in determining that a “preponderance of 
the evidence” standard was not enough to protect the fundamental 
parental rights at stake.283 Despite the fact that proceedings to 
terminate parental rights, unless they are initiated pursuant to ICWA, 
do not require the state to prove unfitness “beyond a reasonable 
doubt,” the level of care that must be taken to ensure constitutional 
fairness when terminating parental rights has been recognized by the 
Supreme Court to be extremely high.284 If parents’ liberty interest to 
custody of their children is severed, it is gone forever with respect to 
those children.285 To then permit evidence of that prior termination to 
be used against a parent in future adjudications of their fitness is to 
perpetuate the ultimate parental penalty forever. 
Unfortunately, ASFA has incentivized states to adopt a process that 
not only ignores this important foundational notion in our 
jurisprudence, but encourages state courts to flout it.286 By allowing 
states to rely on evidence that parents have had their rights 
involuntarily terminated in the past to forego reasonable efforts to 
reunite the family and to move forward with permanency planning 
immediately, Congress has presumed that a past adjudication of 
unfitness serves to prove unfitness in the future. States have taken 
                                                                                                                 
 280. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 754–62. 
 281. Id. at 762 (“In New York, the factfinding stage of a state-initiated permanent neglect proceeding 
bears many of the indicia of a criminal trial.”). 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. at 762–64. 
 284. See supra notes 185–88 and accompanying text. 
 285. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 748–50. 
 286. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)–(E) (2006). 
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these provisions to heart and have relied on them to show that parental 
rights should be terminated with respect to children who have not been 
subjected to abuse or neglect by their parents.287 First, states allow 
child protection agencies to remove children without any evidence that 
they have been abused or neglected, to deny parents any and all 
assistance that may result in their regaining custody of those children, 
and to rely on speculative “evidence” that future abuse may occur to 
terminate parental rights.288 Even before ASFA made it desirable for 
all states to do so, some states had determined that a previous 
adjudication of unfitness could be used to show that a person was unfit 
to parent later children.289 
In 1991, the Florida Supreme Court considered Padgett v. 
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services.290 In Padgett, the 
court considered the appeal of parents who had lost custody to five 
other children due to abuse and neglect.291 The appeal considered the 
lower court’s decision to terminate parental rights to a newborn who 
was removed from the parents’ custody two days after she was born, 
specifically addressing “whether prospective abuse, neglect or 
abandonment can serve as grounds for terminating parental rights.”292 
The court held that, while parental rights are a fundamental liberty 
interest that are protected by the Due Process Clause, if the state can 
show by clear and convincing evidence that the child would be at 
substantial risk of significant harm upon reunification, then 
speculation that the parent would commit future child abuse based 
upon a past finding of abuse was constitutionally permissible.293 
It is clear that the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Padgett made 
the state’s job in proving that parental rights should be terminated with 
respect to a later-born child much easier if those parents had already 
lost parental rights to siblings of that child. The court did not, however, 
                                                                                                                 
 287. See, e.g., In re T.S.B., 177 P.3d 429, 435 (Mont. 2008); In re D.B., Nos. 03CA0015-M, 
03CA0018-M, 2003 WL 22015445, at *4–5 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2003). 
 288. See supra note 287. 
 289. See In re J.L. & D.L., 891 P.2d 1125, 1131 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995). 
 290. Padgett v. Dep’t of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1991). 
 291. Id. at 566. 
 292. Id. at 568. 
 293. Id. at 570–71. 
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rely solely on the fact that the parents had lost parental rights before.294 
The court did emphasize that the lower court had relied upon evidence 
of abuse and neglect from the previous dependency adjudications to 
evaluate that the current termination was proper: 
The question before us today is whether this abuse, neglect or 
abandonment must concern the present child, or whether it can 
concern some other child. Based on our above analysis, we hold 
that the permanent termination of a parent’s rights in one child 
under circumstances involving abuse or neglect may serve as 
grounds for permanently severing the parent’s rights in a different 
child.295 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
Federal Rules of Evidence prohibit the unfair use of evidence against 
a defendant, particularly when it is not relevant to the accusation at 
hand or is more prejudicial than probative of guilt;296 whatever level 
of protection those due process requirements may have provided to 
Florida parents was lowered after the passage of ASFA. 
In ASFA, there is no requirement that courts evaluate the facts and 
circumstances proved in a past termination of parental rights to support 
termination in a present case.297 ASFA simply states that states are not 
required to engage in reasonable efforts to reunite children with 
parents who have lost parental rights in the past.298 Furthermore, the 
provisions allow states to move forward with permanency planning 
and reasonable efforts to effectuate the permanency plan within thirty 
days of a determination that the parents have previously lost their 
                                                                                                                 
 294. Id. at 567. 
 295. Id. at 571. 
 296. See Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941) (“The aim of the requirement of due process 
is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of 
evidence whether true or false.”); FED. R. EVID. 402 (excluding irrelevant evidence); FED. R. EVID. 403 
(requiring exclusion of evidence that is more prejudicial than probative); FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (prohibiting 
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 297. See 42 U.S.C. § 671 (2006). 
 298. Id. § 671(a)(15)(D)(iii). 
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parental rights.299 The fact that the past termination has happened is 
enough to support a finding that the current termination is proper, 
without any consideration of whether the parents actually exhibited 
abusive or neglectful behavior in the past.300 This allows states to 
permanently prohibit people from being parents after only one 
previous involuntary termination, no matter the past or present 
circumstances. But even if states are not taking the opportunity to 
simply rely on the fact that a prior involuntary termination happened, 
they are willing to interpret ASFA to condone Florida’s practice of 
applying evidence of past abuse or neglect to support terminations in 
the present.301 
In Ohio, the Court of Appeals considered the case of two parents 
whose rights to a newborn were terminated based on no evidence that 
the child had been abused and only speculation that abuse could occur 
in the future.302 The newborn was removed from the parents’ custody 
four days after he was born.303 A trial court determined that reasonable 
efforts were not required to reunite the family because the parents had 
lost custody to two siblings of the newborn in the past.304 The state 
held a dependency hearing, in which the infant was declared a 
dependent of the state because his parents were unfit to care for him, 
and immediately moved to terminate parental rights to the newborn.305 
Both parents appealed the ruling on several grounds, including that the 
determination the child should be declared dependent was an 
“anticipatory dependency.”306 
The appellate court disagreed that the dependency determination 
was anticipatory.307 First, it said the determination was based on 
evidence that two older siblings of the newborn were also adjudicated 
                                                                                                                 
 299. Id. § 671(a)(15)(E)(i). 
 300. See id. § 671(a)(15)(D)(iii). 
 301. See Padgett v. Dep’t of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So. 2d 565, 571 (Fla. 1991). 
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as dependent, and their parents’ rights had been terminated as well.308 
The court stated that ample evidence existed concerning the parents’ 
lack of custodial skills with respect to the older children.309 
Additionally, the appellate court pointed out that several witnesses had 
testified as to the appellants’ ability to parent the newborn.310 The 
parents had been urged to take parenting classes while pregnant with 
the child at issue and had not done so.311 The witnesses also testified 
that the parents would need help caring for the newborn but that they 
had not put in place a plan to provide for that care.312 The witnesses 
further testified they were concerned the parents would expose the 
newborn to high-risk individuals they allowed into their home.313 
Although there may have been legitimate concern for the welfare of 
the child, the court relied on constitutionally impermissible evidence 
of past problems to uphold the lower court’s termination of parental 
rights.314 
In another case where a court upheld the termination of parental 
rights based on evidence of past abuse, the Supreme Court of Montana 
considered the constitutionality of the state’s version of ASFA.315 Like 
in ASFA, Montana’s statutory scheme permits the state to forego 
reasonable efforts to reunify parents with a removed child if the parents 
have lost parental rights involuntarily in the past.316 Unlike in ASFA, 
however, the Montana statute requires the circumstances of the past 
termination be “relevant to the parents’ ability to care for the child 
currently at issue.”317 The parents in In re T.S.B. had lost parental 
rights to five other children at various times in the past.318 Within three 
days of her birth, T.S.B. was removed from her parents’ custody by 
                                                                                                                 
 308. In re D.B., 2003 WL 22015445, at *5. 
 309. Id. at *5–6. 
 310. Id. at *5. 
 311. Id. 
 312. Id. 
 313. Id. at *6. 
 314. See In re D.B., 2003 WL 22015445, at *5–6. 
 315. In re T.S.B., 177 P.3d 429, 434–35 (Mont. 2008). 
 316. Id. 
 317. Id. at 436. 
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the Department of Public Health and Human Services (DPHHS).319 
Two days later DPHHS filed for a determination that reasonable 
efforts to reunite the family were not required, that the parents’ rights 
should be terminated, and for permanent custody of the child.320 Based 
on evidence that the parents had been subject to involuntary 
termination of their parental rights in the past, the district court entered 
an order stating the state had established probable cause that T.S.B. 
was a “youth in need of care.”321 
True, Montana requires more than ASFA does to support the 
termination of parental rights for persons whose rights were previously 
terminated in that it requires the state to show evidence of past abuse 
or neglect, not just the fact of a termination.322 But that is not enough 
of a safeguard to protect parents from due process violations. The use 
of past evidence of abuse or neglect is simply not adequate to prove by 
“clear and convincing evidence” that termination of parental rights to 
a different child is necessary. Particularly in situations when a newborn 
is removed from parents’ custody before they have ever really been 
alone with the child, not only is there not enough evidence to support 
the charge of parental unfitness with respect to this child, there is not 
any evidence to that effect. At least a few states have recognized that 
people can change, they mature, their circumstances in life improve, 
and that using evidence of past fitness against them is not lawful to 
show they will be bad parents in the future.323 
There have been cases where courts have refused to allow the 
termination of parental rights based on evidence of past termination. 
In Kansas, before ASFA was passed, an appellate court applied the 
Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test to determine the constitutionality 
of a state statute permitting the state to seek termination of parental 
rights based on evidence of prior loss of parental rights.324 The lower 
court had terminated the mother’s parental rights without a single piece 
                                                                                                                 
 319. Id. 
 320. Id. 
 321. In re T.S.B., 177 P.3d at 431. 
 322. Id. at 434–36. 
 323. See, e.g., In re J.L. & D.L., 891 P.2d 1125 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995). 
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of evidence that termination was necessary other than a certified copy 
of a journal entry from an eight-year-old rights termination involving 
another child of the mother.325 The court concluded that the lower 
court’s application of the statute was a clear violation of the mother’s 
due process rights and was wholly out of procedural due process 
bounds: 
In this state, we do not allow a defendant to be convicted of 
burglary upon proof that he was convicted of that crime eight 
years ago. We would not permit a finding of negligence to stand 
if it were based on nothing more than an eight-year-old prior 
adjudication of negligence. In neither instance would we permit a 
showing of a prior conviction of a crime or a prior adjudication of 
negligence to shift or change the burden of proof. Why should the 
issue of unfitness be treated any differently?326 
The Kansas appellate court in J.L. did not strike the state statute the 
lower court relied upon as unconstitutional because the statute actually 
required courts to do more than rely upon evidence of a prior 
determination of an involuntary termination of parental rights.327 But 
the court did make clear that the liberty interests of the mother were 
weightier than those of the state, that her due process rights had been 
violated by the lower court, and that other courts should not be in the 
practice of applying eight-year-old adjudications as evidence in 
support of present terminations.328 
In a similar situation, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West 
Virginia has held that, even though the Department of Health and 
Human Resources is statutorily required to file for the termination of 
parental rights of all children born to parents whose past rights have 
been involuntarily terminated, a court must determine if the child at 
issue has suffered abuse or neglect before the parents’ rights can be 
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terminated in the present case.329 Reasoning that many factors can 
change for the better in a person’s life that would significantly improve 
his or her ability to parent a child, the court held that a lower court 
cannot terminate parental rights to a child without any evidence that 
child has suffered abuse or neglect.330 
In an Arkansas case, an appellate court overturned a lower court’s 
decision to terminate parental rights after one hearing in which the 
state presented no evidence of unfitness other than the fact that the 
parent’s rights had been involuntarily terminated in the past.331 The 
court of appeals held that, while there was clear and convincing 
evidence the parents had been subject to involuntary termination of 
parental rights in the past, there was not clear and convincing evidence 
that termination would be in the best interests of the child presently 
before the court.332 The additional provision of the Arkansas code 
requiring a clear and convincing evidence standard showing the best 
interests of the child333 served to protect the parents from what would 
have been an automatic severance of their parental rights based on their 
past termination. ASFA does not require states implementing it to have 
such a procedural safeguard; if Arkansas had decided to incorporate 
ASFA as is, the parents in this case would have been without remedy. 
And in a Florida case, a lower court terminated a mother’s parental 
rights to her twins because of the involuntary termination of another 
child five years prior to the twins’ birth.334 The appellate court held 
that the lower court improperly terminated the mother’s parental rights 
to the twins based on evidence that another of her children had suffered 
injuries while in her custody years earlier.335 The court stated: 
DCF failed to present any evidence that the mother suffers from 
any mental illness, drug addiction, or other impairments that 
would cause her to be a danger to her children or render her 
                                                                                                                 
 329. In re George Glen B., Jr., 532 S.E.2d 64, 68 (W. Va. 2000). 
 330. Id. at 72. 
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incapable of reestablishing a relationship with them. DCF 
essentially argued that the severity of the injuries to the sibling 
child . . . was sufficient to find that there was a substantial risk of 
significant harm to the twins . . . . Based on the evidence presented 
at the hearing, however, DCF did not meet its burden to show that 
the twins are at a substantial risk of significant harm.336 
Unfortunately, not every court may be as careful to avoid 
improperly severing parental rights when the only evidence is from 
past adjudications, especially considering how ASFA creates a 
procedural structure that at least implies the safeguards applied in the 
above cases are not necessary. In addition to the problem with relying 
on old evidence to prove new allegations, statutes relying on ASFA 
improperly incentivize courts to improperly shift the burden of proof 
away from states, who should have to prove that parents are a risk to 
their children, to parents to demonstrate fitness. 
2.   Shifting the Burden of Proof to Parents 
The expedited process provisions in ASFA essentially set up a 
procedural trap that puts parents in the position of proving they can be 
good parents, instead of requiring states to carry the burden of proof, 
by clear and convincing evidence, that parents are a risk to their 
children.337 By encouraging states to skip making reasonable efforts to 
reunite families because of a prior termination of parental rights, 
ASFA built in a presumption that reuniting such families would be 
futile. Also, because they are required to seek a permanency hearing 
within thirty days of a determination that reasonable efforts are not 
required, there is no opportunity for states to gather evidence showing 
the parent is unfit. That means the only evidence a court could rely 
upon to terminate parental rights in the case before it is evidence of a 
prior termination, as discussed in Section III.B.1, supra. This puts 
parents in the position of having to prove their fitness instead of 
requiring states to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the 
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parents’ unfitness. 
Some states have not been coy about their interpretation of the 
expedited process provisions of ASFA; that is, once it has been 
determined that a parent has involuntarily lost parental rights in the 
past, the state and court’s presumptions are then that the person is unfit 
to parent any future children.338 Only if the parent is able to prove that 
she is now fit can she overcome that presumption. And in some states, 
even though the statute may not have a presumption of unfitness 
explicitly built in, the application of the expedited termination of 
parental rights provisions serve to create a presumption of unfitness. 
In Ohio, an appellate court reviewed and upheld the termination of 
parental rights with respect to a statute that included an express 
presumption of unfitness when a parent had lost rights involuntarily in 
the past.339 There, the father of the child was unable to challenge the 
constitutionality of the presumption against him because he had failed 
to raise that argument during the hearings below.340 The court upheld 
the termination of his parental rights based on the statute and upheld 
the termination of the mother’s parental rights based on evidence used 
in a prior hearing to show she was an unfit parent to three other 
children.341 The state relied upon evidence that she was unfit to raise 
her newborn as her other three children had been removed two years 
before because she failed to maintain a clean home.342 No new 
evidence was introduced that her home was still dirty at the time the 
child at issue was born, and the mother did introduce some evidence 
                                                                                                                 
 338. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2271(a)(1) (West, WestlawNext through 2013 Reg. and Sp. Sess.) 
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that she had improved her ability to keep her home clean.343 The 
appellate court did not consider the lower court’s reliance on the old 
evidence and upheld the termination, essentially stating the mother 
carried the burden of proof to show that she was a fit parent and that 
she failed to meet it.344 
In a 2007 Montana case, the appellate court upheld a termination of 
parental rights after the lower court heard evidence that the mother’s 
rights should be terminated because her parental rights had been 
previously terminated, leaving her the burden of disproving a 
presumption of unfitness.345 The appellate court rejected her 
contention that the statute created a presumption against her because 
the state was required to show (1) that her parental rights had been 
terminated before and (2) that the prior termination was relevant to the 
current termination.346 The court also noted earlier in the opinion that 
the mother had the opportunity to present evidence of her fitness at 
trial and had chosen not to do so.347 The court reasoned that its 
procedures were constitutionally sound because it could consider 
evidence of abuse or neglect with respect to the child at issue, like 
courts in other states with similar provisions.348 Unfortunately, 
however, the court did not actually consider any evidence regarding 
the child at issue and relied instead on evidence from the earlier 
terminations, thereby requiring the mother to prove the evidence from 
the earlier terminations was not relevant to the current proceeding.349 
A year later, the Montana Supreme Court considered an appeal from 
the termination of a father’s parental rights to a newborn who had 
never been in his physical custody.350 The father argued the lower 
court’s procedure of relying on evidence of prior terminations 
unconstitutionally shifted to him the burden to prove he was a fit 
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parent.351 Because the father received notice of the hearing to terminate 
his parental rights, and he had an opportunity to present evidence to 
“rebut the State’s allegations and show changed circumstances,” he 
was not disadvantaged at the hearing.352 The court noted that the father 
“chose not to present any witnesses or evidence demonstrating 
changed circumstances.”353 The court concluded, in the same breath, 
that “[t]he statutory scheme did not create a presumption against [the 
father] as the burden remained on the State.”354 
Although it is common practice in some states to allow the burden 
to shift to parents to prove their fitness following a showing they had 
lost parental rights involuntarily in the past, some courts have called 
the practice or policy into question. In a Kansas case decided before 
ASFA was passed, for example, a court of appeals considered whether 
a rebuttable presumption of unfitness written into the procedural 
requirements in termination proceedings complied with the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.355 The court held that 
although evidence of a prior adjudication of unfitness could be 
probative in a future hearing about the parent’s fitness, it is 
unconstitutional to require parents to prove their fitness by clear and 
convincing evidence.356 The court lowered the standard applied to 
parents presenting evidence to rebut the presumption of their unfitness 
to “a preponderance of the evidence,” but the court declined to declare 
unconstitutional the statute shifting the burden to the parents.357 
In L.D.B., the Kansas appellate court relied upon Supreme Court 
precedent to show that it is not always improper for a state to shift the 
burden of proof onto the non-moving party.358 In Turnipseed, the 
Supreme Court considered whether a statute using evidence that an 
individual sustained an injury on a train as prima facie evidence of 
negligence violated the Due Process Clause by shifting the burden of 
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proof to a defendant.359 The Court held that the burden shift did not 
violate the Due Process Clause if there was a reasonable opportunity 
for the defendant to submit his own evidence in his defense.360 The 
Court based its holding, however, on the premise that the legislative 
provision prescribing a rule of evidence, either in a civil or criminal 
matter, not be “unreasonable in itself.”361 In the case of ASFA, 
provisions permitting states to rely on evidence that a person behaved 
badly in the past toward a different child to prove the person will 
behave badly in the future allow the state to invade a fundamental 
liberty interest. They also shift the burden to disprove that old evidence 
and are therefore unreasonable and cannot stand. 
C.   Applying the Mathews Balancing Test and the Santosky 
Standard to Termination of Parental Rights in the States 
If Congress had heeded, in drafting ASFA, or states adhered to, in 
implementing ASFA, the Court’s balancing test in Mathews v. 
Eldridge, it would be clear that the states’ interests in the expedited 
procedures in ASFA do not outweigh the fundamental liberty interests 
to parent. Also, if the drafters and implementers of ASFA had kept in 
mind the constitutional element that parental rights to a child can only 
be terminated upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence that 
the termination is necessary as required by Santosky v. Kramer, the 
expedited procedures for termination of parental rights would not be 
in use today. The expedited procedures in ASFA are woefully deficient 
when it comes to their constitutionality. Unfortunately, these 
procedures routinely—likely daily—serve as the basis for terminating 
parental rights in states throughout the country.362 
When applying the expedited termination provisions in ASFA to the 
Mathews test to determine whether they are constitutionally sound 
procedures, it is clear they are not. The Mathews test is a three-part 
analysis that requires balancing the interests of parents subject to 
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involuntary termination of their parental rights against those of the 
state and public to seek efficient resolutions to problems.363 The 
Mathews test first requires that courts look at the interests of the private 
party on the receiving end of the governmental action.364 The private 
interest that would be affected by the governmental action in this 
situation is that which has been deemed one of the most important 
fundamental liberties protected by the Constitution.365 When it is 
severed, the damage is permanent. Unlike persons sentenced to jail for 
a portion of their lives and who will ultimately regain their freedom, a 
parent who loses parental rights is forever without them.366 
The second consideration in the Mathews test is the level of risk in 
erroneous deprivation of rights when applying the procedures and the 
probable value of any additional procedural safeguards that might be 
implemented.367 In the case of termination of parental rights based on 
a past involuntary termination, the risk of error is extremely high when 
states are permitted to use evidence that is wholly unrelated to the 
matter before the court. Evidence of past bad behavior cannot serve to 
prove that future bad behavior is so likely to occur that a permanent 
severance of parental rights is justified. One of the most fundamental 
principles of the American judicial system is the idea that people are 
“innocent until prove[n] guilty” of the crime for which they have been 
accused368 and that later behavior will be judged independently of past 
behavior. 
The third factor in the Mathews test requires the court to consider 
the public interest in preserving the procedural status quo, including 
the potential costs of additional or different procedural safeguards.369 
One interest of the government in expediting termination of parental 
rights is to protect children from abusive or neglectful parents.370 But, 
rushing that process is not necessarily going to protect children from 
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parents who might do them harm. Once the children have been 
removed from their parents’ custody, there is little harm in making the 
same reasonable efforts to reunify the family as are made for other 
families. Those children have already been placed somewhere they are 
supposed to be safe, and taking an additional few months to a year to 
help their parents address their shortcomings is preferable to risk 
terminating parental rights of those who have the ability to parent. The 
efficiency of rushing to termination is lost when the termination never 
should have happened at all. 
On the assumption that there will be parents aplenty to adopt them, 
another reason the government has sought to expedite the procedures 
for terminating parental rights is based on the theory that doing so will 
free children for adoption as quickly as possible.371 This assumption 
has proven untrue in the years since ASFA was passed. Children are 
essentially becoming orphaned instead of remaining in foster care until 
their parents can regain custody, or they age out of the system.372 This 
has created a huge administrative burden on states that are responsible 
for figuring out what to do with all of the state-created orphans who 
are not supposed to be languishing in foster care.373 Changing the 
procedural safeguards to allow parents who have involuntarily lost 
parental rights in the past more time to show that they can adequately 
parent their children would likely not create more of an administrative 
burden than the current system does. 
Another way that ASFA and its progeny statutes have impeded the 
due process rights of parents is through their disregard for applying the 
“clear and convincing evidence” standard required by Santosky. States 
have implemented provisions requiring clear and convincing evidence 
of prior termination of parental rights be proved at a hearing to 
terminate parental rights to subsequent children of those parents, but 
all that requires is a showing of past bad behavior toward different 
children.374 That requirement cannot be considered constitutionally 
adequate to support the termination of a fundamental constitutional 
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right to a different child. Clear and convincing evidence that the parent 
is unfit to parent this child is the only standard that can satisfy the high 
level of protection afforded to substantive and procedural due process 
rights. Using past evidence of bad behavior to prove future bad 
conduct is certainly not clear and convincing evidence. In fact, it is no 
evidence at all. 
CONCLUSION 
It took far too long for the public consciousness to accept that child 
abuse and neglect are a societal problem that can be addressed by the 
state. It took even longer for the Supreme Court to recognize that 
courts should evaluate those accusations of neglect and abuse with the 
highest order of care because the Constitution requires that the rights 
of parents to raise their children be carefully protected. But when the 
public, lawmakers, and judges all arrived at the current level of 
consciousness about child abuse and neglect, they chose solutions to 
the problem that are not consistent with the constitutional rights of the 
interested parties. Congress overshot its goal to reduce the number of 
children in foster care by unconstitutionally severing the fundamental 
rights of parents. 
Congress and the Supreme Court must address this problem and 
begin the process of allowing families to repair themselves before they 
are permanently torn apart. Congress can do its part by changing 
ASFA to ease the lightning-fast provisions of expedited termination of 
parental rights in cases where parents have involuntarily lost parental 
rights in the past. If ASFA simply dropped that one provision, states 
could return to giving parents who have previously lost parental rights 
a chance to regain custody of the later-born children. While 
reunification services may be perceived by some to be expensive, 
especially because they are unlikely to actually help, it is a less 
expensive solution in the long run to help parents retain their rights 
rather than leave the state to try and place children into adoptive homes 
that, by and large, do not exist. One to two years of reunification 
services for parents, who can then regain custody of their children and 
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bear all the costs of raising them, is a much smaller price for the state 
to pay than up to eighteen years of foster care. 
Even if Congress were to amend ASFA, thereby requiring states to 
drop their exemption of reasonable efforts provisions, it may be 
necessary for the Supreme Court to make clear to states that their 
procedures for termination of parental rights may be unconstitutional. 
Prior to ASFA, states engaged in expedited termination processes that 
ran afoul of the Due Process Clause. If ASFA were to change, some 
states may try to rely on state court precedent to continue those 
unconstitutionally expedited termination proceedings. In that case, the 
Supreme Court should make clear that (1) relying on evidence of past 
determinations of unfitness cannot serve as proof of unfitness for other 
children, and (2) that shifting the burden to parents to prove their 
fitness, rather than the state proving they are unfit, is not 
constitutionally reasonable and does not comply with Santosky v. 
Kramer. Anything less would allow states to continue hurting parents 
and their children by using assumptions and conjecture against them 
to justify permanently depriving them of their parental rights. 
The right to parent cannot forever be severed by the state based on 
a determination that a person was not a good parent to a child in the 
past. Each time a parent has a child, that parent should receive full 
constitutional protection during the process to decide whether he or 
she can parent this child. The societal costs of requiring the state to 
engage in a careful determination of the person’s ability to parent is 
minimal compared to the societal costs of living in a country that 
permits the state to permanently judge someone incapable of 
parenting, no matter the reality. The risk that parents who would be no 
worse than any other parent lose their parental rights to every child 
born to them in the future is far too great to justify the efficiency of 
trying to free children for adoption, especially when it is clear that most 
children will not ever be adopted anyway. Lawmakers and judges need 
to start relying on their own rhetoric about the value of supporting 
families and apply those ideals to all families, even the imperfect ones. 
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